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I. INTRODUCTION
Architecture is the most commonly experienced and perva-
sive of all the arts. The creative efforts of architects culminate in
structures used for shelter, pleasure, business, entertainment,
and transportation.1 Architects express their design concepts in
sketches, elevations, floor plans, working drawings, specifica-
tions, renditions, and three-dimensional models.2 Their labors in
shaping the ideas for a building from rough conceptions into
plans and then into completed structures are similar to the ef-
forts of other creators. An architect is as much an author as is a
sculptor or a dramatist. His plans, renditions, and the resulting
structure will ordinarily show originality and will reflect his per-
sonality. As Justice Holmes stated, "Personality always contains
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwrit-
ing, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreduci-
ble, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright
1. Hellmuth, Obsolescence Ab Initio: The New Act and Architectural Copyright, 22
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 169, 170-71 (1974-75). Architecture is regarded as one of the fine
arts, along with painting, drawing, and sculpture. Jones Bros. v. Underkoffier, 16 F.
Supp. 729, 730 (M.D. Pa. 1936)(citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d
ed. 1934)). There does not appear to be any judicial authority to the contrary. Comment,
Copyright Protection for the Architect: Leaks in a Legal Lean-To, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 458,
481 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cal. Comment]. But see Maser v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 212
n. 23 (1954)(1910 Copyright Office regulations stated that the fine arts included paint-
ings, drawings, and sculpture).
2. Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 71. Cf. Katz, Copyright Protection of Architectural
Plans, Drawings and Designs, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 224, 229-30 (1954). See also
SUBCOMMIrTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY No. 27 ON THE COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, Copy-
right in Architectural Works (Comm. Print 1961), [hereinafter cited as STUDY No. 27]
reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 87 (1963). This study, one of thirty-four reports
prepared by the Copyright Office as groundwork for the Copyright Office Revision Re-
port, states that architectural works include the drawings, plans, and models for a struc-
ture and the structure itself. STUDY No. 27 at 67. The plans are a step in the total crea-
tive process.
[Vol. 37
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unless there is a restriction in the words of the act."'
The Copyright Act of 19094 did not include architectural
plans, blueprints, or designs in its classes of copyrightable sub-
ject matter;5 nor does the 1976 Act explicitly mention architec-
tural works." This continuing statutory silence, however, does
not preclude all protection for architectural works. It is well es-
tablished, for example, that plans are copyrightable "writings.
' 7
Less clear, however, is whether copyright protection extends to
the use of plans without actual copying or to the structures de-
picted by the plans.
Although copyright protection is available for several forms
of architectural expression, a variety of restrictions have been
imposed that severely limit its adequacy." These limitations pre-
sent serious problems because architects, like other creators,
3. Bleisten v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). See also Im-
perial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1972)(architect of blueprints
is as much an author as the dramatist); MacMillan Co. v. I.V.O.W. Corp., 495 F. Supp.
1134, 1144 (D. Vt. 1980)(working plans protected by common-law copyright); Ga-On
Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd
mem., 492 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1974) (the peculiar arrangement of a kitchen, bedroom, and
family room results in a design concept that is a marketable and copyrightable product);
Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 205 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1984);
Katz, supra note 2, at 229-30; Note, Innovation and Imitation: Artistic Advance and the
Legal Protection of Architectural Works, 70 CORN. L. REv. 81 (1984)[hereinafter cited as
Cornell Note] (architectural works must be protected even though imitation plays a large
role in architectural advancement); Note, The Protection of Architectural Plans as In-
tellectual Property, 6 Loy. LAL. REv. 97 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Loyola Note].
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1973).
5. Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 170. See 17 U.S.C. § 5(i) (1973)(providing protection
for "drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character").
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982); 1 M. NMMMER, NiMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[D][2] (1985). The statutory and common-law limitations on the
protection afforded to architectural works that developed prior to January 1, 1978, the
effective date of the 1976 Act, are still viable in light of 17 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982). See
infra notes 203-213 and accompanying text.
7. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1972); 1 M. NIM-
MER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D] [2], at 2-105; STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 69; Katz, supra
note 2, at 229-37 (discussing common-law copyright protection for plans); Cornell Note,
supra note 3, at 84, 96-97. See also infra notes 10-29 and accompanying text. It is impor-
tant to note that the terms "drawings" and "plans" as used herein cover several of the
ways in which architects express their ideas, but are not broad enough to encompass
every form of architectural expression. Sketches, designs, blueprints, electrical and
mechanical drawings, specifications, elevations, graphics, and models are some of the va-
rious media of expression used by architects. Katz, supra note 2, at 230; STUDY No. 27,
supra note 2, at 67. See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 170, 173 n.2 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
8. See infra notes 151-84 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 37 S. C. L. Rev.  395 1985-1986
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
need to be rewarded for their ingenuity and effort. Without ade-
quate copyright incentives, progress in this important art form
might be retarded.9 This article discusses the nature and scope
of the protection that copyright affords to architectural works
and the several limitations on this protection. Initially, it consid-
ers the copyrightability of plans and the architect's right to con-
trol their reproduction in copies and their use in the construc-
tion of the buildings depicted. The article then analyzes the
copyrightability of structures and discusses the rights that an ar-
chitect has in a completed building. In the course of this analy-
sis, the article also proposes several theories for architects to as-
sert against the unauthorized copying and use of their creative
works.
II. THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF PLANS
The Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings."10 Accordingly, the Copyright Act provides that "pro-
tection subsists. . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise corn-
9. Cf. Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 81, 91-94 (discussing the economic rationale for
protection). The American copyright doctrine, based upon the Constitution's copyright
clause, holds that the public interest in the creation and dissemination of intellectual
works justifies the toleration of the copyright monopoly. The interests and rights of the
public, however, are paramount and are accorded primacy over the secondary concerns
of the creators. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 509, 510. Thus, it is
necessary to recognize that if the scope of protection is too broad, creative efforts by
others might be discouraged. Accordingly, a tension in copyright law results from the
attempt to balance two competing policies: providing incentives for authors to create and
protecting the public's interest in access to and use of intellectual creations. This ten-
sion, recognized two centuries ago by Lord Mansfield in Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep.
139, 140 (1785), is inherent in copyright and intellectual property law generally. See
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Morrison v.
Solomons, 494 F. Supp. 218, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Baird, Common Law Intellectual
Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHL
L. REv. 411, 415 (1983). This tension is apparent also in the sphere of architectural
works, where the need for incentives arguably conflicts with the need to imitate or bor-
row from previous architectural works. Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 91-94.
10. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
[Vol. 37
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municated . . . ." Copyrightable subject matter encompasses
not only literary works, but also "any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative or aesthetic labor. 1 2 Courts interpreting the
1909 Act have held that architectural plans are protectible under
section 5(i) as drawings or plastic works of a scientific or techni-
cal nature, and several commentators have argued that protec-
tion also might be appropriate under the "works of art" classifi-
cation in section 5(g).13
The classes of works specified in section 5 of the 1909 Act
are now covered in the aggregate by the categories of copyright-
able subject matter set forth in section 102(a) of the 1976 Act.14
This listing includes "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," 15
which encompass two- and three-dimensional works of fine,
graphic, and applied art, charts, technical drawings, diagrams,
and models.16 The 1976 Act's legislative history clearly estab-
lishes that architectural plans and drawings are protected by
11. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). It makes no difference that architects write with tech-
nical signs and symbols rather than words. Cf. Katz, supra note 2, at 232.
12. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561, reh'g denied 414 U.S. 883 (1973); A.
LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (5th ed. 1979). Architecture is both a "useful art" and a
"science." The courts have interpreted these expressions, as well as the terms "writings"
and "authors," expansively. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)(operating system
software is protectible); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)(statuette used as lamp base
is copyrightable); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)(photo-
graphs are copyrightable). See also Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 471-73. The first
copyright statute, enacted in 1790, included maps and charts as protectible subject mat-
ter. An 1802 amendment added prints, and three-dimensional works became protectible
when coverage was extended to the fine arts (e.g., "statue, statuary, and ... models or
designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts." Copyright Act of July 8, 1870,
ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212). The 1909 comprehensive revision substituted "works of
art" for the term "fine art," and continued the trend toward broader coverage. See
Hauhart, The Eternal Wavering Line-The Continuing Saga of Mazer v. Stein, 6 HAM-
LINE L. REv. 95, 97 (1983).
13. See, e.g. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1972);
N. BooRsTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 2:25, at 76 (1981); 1 M. NIMiuER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D],
at 2-104 & n.163; Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 173; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 475,
480.
14. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
& ADMIN. NEws 5659.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)(1982). Since architects' creations fall within the § 102(a)(5)
category of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" and have functional applications, it
is necessary to consider the impact of the Act's "useful article" and "utilitarian function"
limitations. See infra notes 151-84 and accompanying text.
16. Id. § 101 (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
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copyright,17 despite the "useful article" limitation contained in
the Act.'8
The two essential requirements for protection-originality
and fixation in a tangible medium of expression-are easily sat-
isfied by architectural plans and drawings so long as the archi-
tect does not copy another's plans.19 The originality requirement
simply means that the work must owe its origin to the author
and is "little more than a prohibition of actual copying."20 The
architect must create his work independently, exerting a mini-
mal level of creative labor.2' Originality, thus, is a modest re-
quirement;22 it requires only independent creation, not novelty
17. Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 177 (W.D.
Tex. 1983)(the Act's legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to protect
architectural plans and drawings); H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55; N. BooR-
STYN, supra note 13, § 2:25, at 76. In addition, it was well established that architectural
plans were protected, prior to their publication, by common-law copyright. Smith v.
Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P.2d 546 (1959); Jones v. Spindel, 113 Ga. App. 191, 147
S.E.2d 615 (1966); Edgar H. Wood Assocs., Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886
(1964); Krahmer v. Luing, 127 N.J. Super. 270, 317 A.2d 96 (Ch. Div. 1974); Katz, supra
note 2, at 229-37; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 461-62; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at
84; Note, Protecting Architectural Plans and Structures with Design Patents and Copy-
rights, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 79, 80 (1967)[hereinafter cited as Drake Note].
18. The Act affords protection to "the design of a useful article... only if, and only
to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utili-
tarian aspects of the article." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(definition of "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works"). See infra notes 151-84 and accompanying text. Blueprints have a
utilitarian function and are meant to be used to teach a builder how to construct the
dwelling they portray. Further, it often may be difficult to identify any features in
blueprints that are separable and capable of existing independently of the plan's utilita-
rian aspects. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[0], at 2-104. This limitation may fore-
close copyright protection for some useful articles, but it does not preclude protection for
plans because they are not "useful articles" as defined in the Act. A useful article is "an
article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appear-
ance of the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(definition of "useful
article")(emphasis added). A blueprint conveys information to the builder on how to
erect the building it portrays. It is a copyrightable work that functions to portray the
appearance of a useful article-the completed functional structure.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55 (plans and drawings would of course be
copyrightable); N. BooRsTYN, supra note 13, § 2:1, at 22.
20. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
21. Id.; A. LATMAN, supra note 12, at 20-21.
22. N. BOORSTYN, supra note 13, § 2:2, at 22-23. The author must create indepen-
dently a work that is "more than a trivial variation," that is recognizably "his own," and
that is produced by his own labor, skill, and judgment. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 178 (W.D. Tex. 1983). See also A. LATmAN, supra note 12, at 20-21;
Katz, supra note 2, at 231-32; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 91-94 (discussing the inpor-
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or aesthetic merit.23 The fixation requirement 4 is satisfied when
a work is embodied in a tangible medium of expression that is
sufficiently permanent to enable the work to be perceived, repro-
duced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration.6
Thus, an architect's creation is fixed when he draws blueprints,
sketches a rendition, or constructs a model.
Of course, an architect's creative horizons may be limited to
some extent by zoning and building restrictions, code require-
ments, functional considerations, and the client's needs and de-
mands.26 These limitations, however, do not affect the copyright-
ability of plans. While these requirements might limit creative
options, the final product still owes its origin to the architect.27
By analogy, a musical composer's creative options are limited by
the thirteen tones, their octaves, and their variations. Other con-
straints are imposed by limitations on a performer's range and
on our ability to hear. Although the average composer of popular
music works under these physical limitations," the copyright-
ability of musical works is not questioned.2 9
tance of borrowing and imitation in architecture). Architects, like artists, authors, and
playwrights, draw upon the works of earlier creators for ideas and concepts as well as
inspiration. This borrowing of general ideas does not, however, prevent their works from
being copyrightable. See also STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 69 (many architectual plans
have been registered at the Copyright Office).
23. H.R. REP. No. 1896, supra note 14, at 51.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
25. Id. § 101 (1982)(definition of "fixation"); N. BooRsTYN, supra note 13, § 2:4, at
26.
26. It should be noted that a client's ideas for a building are not copyrightable. 17
U.S.C. § 102(b)(1982). Cf. Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Servs., Inc., 476 F.2d
386, 390 (8th Cir. 1973)(concept of T-shaped building not copyrightable); Ga-On Homes,
Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973)(a house can-
not be built without a kitchen, family room, and bedrooms); Copyrightability-Works
Not Copyrightable-Ideas, 1984 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-F9 (Nov. 8, 1984), reprinted
in 1985 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. 25,753 (CCH)(concept of project to redredge the Erie Canal
and use the dredged material to build an island in N.Y. Harbor is not copyrightable, but
written expression about these ideas may be protectible).
27. It is the architect's fixed expression of ideas-his client's, his own, and
others'--that is protected. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982); HR REP. No. 1476, supra note 14,
at 59; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847,
857 (D.N.J. 1981); MacMillan Co. v. I.V.O.W. Corp., 495 F. Supp. 1134, 1144 (D. Vt.
1980); Krahmer v. Luing, 127 N.J. Super. 270, 273, 317 A.2d 96, 97 (Ch. Div. 1974)("An
architect's drawings and specifications clearly fall within the scope of common law copy-
right protection."). Questions of copyright ownership may, however, result from the ar-
chitect's relationship to his client.
28. A. SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 196 (2d ed. 1939).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)(1982); N. BooRsTYN, supra note 13, § 2:7.
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III. AN ARCHITECT'S RIGHTS IN PLANS
A. The Right to Reproduce
It is well established that the unauthorized copying of copy-
righted plans infringes the reproduction right. If the copier then
modifies those plans or sells them, he has also infringed the au-
thor's rights to distribute and display, as well as to prepare ad-
aptations (derivative works).3 0 Thus, copyright enables the ar-
chitect to control and profit from the full panoply of artistic
rights except for the performance right, which, by definition,
does not apply.3 1 Plans can, therefore, be copied, adapted, sold,
or distributed in the form of another set of plans only with the
architect's consent.32
For instance, in Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v.
Empire Construction Co.,33 an architectural firm prepared draw-
ings for the defendants' use in the construction of a twenty-two
unit apartment complex. The plaintiff delivered eighteen sets of
blueprints to one of the defendants and retained the originals.
Two sets were filed with the city's building code administrator,
and a building permit was issued. The defendants paid the
plaintiff for its architectural services and used the plans to com-
30. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2), (3), (5)(1982); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J.
1981); May v. Bray, 30 C.O. Bull. 435 (S.D. Cal. 1955); STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 69;
1 M. NImmER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-105; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 13, § 2:25;
Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 173; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 84, 96-97. This principle
was recognized at common law. See, e.g., Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P.2d
546 (1959); Edgar H. Wood Assocs., Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886 (1964);
Krahiner v. Luing, 127 N.J. Super. 270, 317 A.2d 96 (Ch. Div. 1974). Many of the com-
mon-law copyright cases were primarily concerned with what actions constituted a gen-
eral publication. There was uncertainty whether construction published the plans and
whether their filing of the plans with a municipal official, as required by law, constituted
a divestive publication. See Katz, supra note 2, at 229-37. Even though the 1976 Act
abolished common-law copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982), these cases are still relevant
because of section 113(b) of the Act. See infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982). This is a commonsense limitation. Plans, as "pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural works," cannot be recited, played, or acted. Id. § 101 (defini-
tion of "perform").
32. The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to exercise and to authorize the
exercise of any of the enumerated rights. Id. § 106. Cf. Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Wes-
toaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 205 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1984)(architect claimed
that his common-law copyright was infringed by defendant's unauthorized distribution
and modification of his plans, but court found his cause of action was preempted by §
301 of the Copyright Act).
33. 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982).
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plete construction. 4 Shortly thereafter the defendants decided
to build a second apartment complex on an adjoining parcel of
land and, without the permission or knowledge of the plaintiff,
copied the plans for the first complex. Defendants then used the
copied plans to construct a second, almost identical apartment
complex. When the plaintiff discovered that the plans had been
copied, it placed copyright notice on the original blueprints, reg-
istered its copyright, and sued for infringement. 5
Plaintiff contended that defendants had infringed its copy-
right by reproducing the plans, preparing or assisting in prepar-
ing a derivative work, reproducing copies of this derivative work,
distributing copies of this derivative work to subcontractors and
suppliers, and displaying the plans publicly by filing a copy with
the city's building code department.36 The court concluded that
the plans were copyrightable, that they were not a commissioned
work, that plaintiff had not transferred copyright ownership by
giving copies to defendants, and that the plans had been repro-
duced by defendants.37 Accordingly, the court held the defend-
ants jointly and severally liable for infringement.3 8
B. The Right to Control Use
Plans are valuable not for their own sake, but for the bene-
fit to be derived from their use. They are meant to be used to
construct the building portrayed in conformity with the archi-
tect's design ideas and concepts. An architect, therefore, is nec-
essarily concerned not only about the actual copying of his
34. Id. at 254-55.
35. Id. at 255. Plaintiff also named a lumber company and an engineer as
defendants.
36. Id. at 256.
37. Id. One of the defendants claimed that it, not plaintiff, was the copyright owner
of the plans under the work-made-for-hire doctrine and that even if plaintiff owned the
copyright, it was an innocent infringer and its use was a fair use. The court concluded
that plaintiff was an independent contractor and not defendant's employee and that
plaintiff, thus, owned the copyright. Id. at 258. It also concluded that defendant could
not claim copyright ownership under the Act's joint-authorship provisions. Id. at 259.
The court found that defendant's use of the plans was not a fair use and that defendant
was not an innocent infringer because it was aware that plaintiff claimed copyright own-
ership. Id. at 260-61.
38. The lumber company and the individual hired to review the plans were not lia-
ble as contributory or vicarious infringers. Id. at 261-62.
1986]
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plans, but also about their unauthorized use. 9
The use of architectural plans to construct a dwelling is
analogous to the use of a sculptor's drawings or model to execute
a completed statue. The 1909 Act granted the right "to com-
plete, execute, and finish [the copyrighted work] if it be a model
or design for a work of art, '40 and this right is now included in
the exclusive rights to control reproduction and the preparation
of derivative works.41 Accordingly, a sculptor's copyright is in-
fringed if another artist copies either his two-dimensional draw-
ings or his finished three-dimensional statue and creates a sub-
stantially similar piece of sculpture. 2
Since the copyright in blueprints protects against their un-
authorized reproduction in the form of additional plans,43 it also
would appear to protect against the unauthorized use of those
plans in the construction of the building depicted." Protection
seems to be warranted by a simple analogy to the protection af-
39. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D][2], at 2-106.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1973); Katz, supra note 2, at 237-38.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2) (1982).
42. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)(infringement of statuettes used as
lamp bases); King Features Synd. v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924)(manufacture
and sale of toy that was reproduced from a comic strip horse); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner
Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Group, 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(dolls based on
copyrighted cartoon characters held to infringe); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F.
Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936)(cemetery memorial). Cf. Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v.
Public Building Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. I. 1970)(statue).
43. See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170
(W.D. Tex. 1983); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981); MacMillan Co. v.
I.V.O.W. Corp., 1978-81 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 25,217 (D. Vt. 1976)(decision based
on common-law copyright infringement, with federal jurisdiction based on diversity);
Herman Frankel Org. v. Wolfe, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 819 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Herman
Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1973); May v. Bray, 30 C.O. Bull.
435 (S.D. Cal. 1955). See generally Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 84, 94, 96. State courts
have reached the same conclusion under common-law copyright principles. See Read v.
Turner, 239 Cal. App. 2d 504, 48 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1966); Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d
546, 345 P.2d 546 (1959); Kisling v. Rothschild, 388 So. 2d 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Jones v. Spindel, 113 Ga. App. 191, 147 S.E.2d 615 (1966) and 122 Ga. App. 390, 177
S.E.2d 187 (1970); Edgar H. Wood Assocs., Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886
(1964); O'Bryan Constr. Co. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 139 Vt. 81, 424 A.2d 244 (1980);
Wallace v. Helm 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 121 (Cal. Super. 1969).
44. "The fact that a work in one medium has been copied from a work in another
medium does not render it any less a 'copy.'" 2 M. NiMMAER, supra note 6, § 8.01[B], at
8-13. Professor Nimmer added, however, that this proposition is qualified in the case of
"useful articles." Id. at 8-13 to 8-14. But see STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 69 (highly
doubtful that copyright in plans protects against unauthorized use).
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forded a sculptor.45 While several decisions appear to support
this proposition, most cases have involved attempts by plaintiffs
to establish that defendants reproduced their copyrighted plans
by creating an infringing set of blueprints before using the plans
to construct the second, almost identical structure.46
Nevertheless, it is possible for a person to obtain a set of
plans and, without reproducing them in copies, use them to
erect the building they portray. This unauthorized use of plans
may be more damaging to an architect's economic interests than
the unauthorized reproduction of the plans themselves. 47 If un-
authorized building or other use of copyrighted plans occurs, a
significant part of the market for the plans is destroyed and the
architect's copyright is of little value. Despite the obvious im-
portance of the right to control the use of protected plans, how-
ever, some courts and commentators have suggested that a
structure is not a "copy" of its plans and that the copyright on
architectural plans does not encompass a right to control use.48
45. Cf. Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 173-74, 177-78.
46. Cf. Kisling v. Rothschild, 388 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Herman
Frankel Org. v. Wolfe, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 819 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Herman Frankel Org.
v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v.
Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982); MacMillan Co. v. I.V.O.W. Corp.,
1978-81 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 25,217 (D. Vt. 1976); O'Bryan Constr. Co. v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 139 Vt. 81, 424 A.2d 244 (1980).
47. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D][2], at 2-106; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at
95.
48. STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 69-71; N. BooRsTYN, supra note 13, § 2:25, at 77
("It was generally accepted under prior case law that the unauthorized construction of a
building based upon copyrighted plans did not constitute copyright infringement of the
plans."); 1 M. NImMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-106 (discussing the architect's rights
when a contractor obtains a set of copyrighted plans and uses them without authoriza-
tion and without making a two-dimensional reproduction); Hellmuth, supra note 1, at
173-74, 176-77 (one does not infringe by constructing the building described in the pro-
tected plans); Katz, supra note 2, at 237-39; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 84-85, 95
(discussing the right to build). See, e.g., Imperial Homes v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th
Cir. 1972); Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 941 (W.D. Tex.
1982); DeSilva Constr. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962); Muller v. Tribor-
ough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Cf. Krahmer v. Luing, 127 N.J.
Super. 270, 276, 317 A.2d 96, 99 (Ch. Div. 1974)("Of course, the interior and exterior is
copyable by anyone with sufficient draftsmanship abilities."). The issue of whether a
structure is a copy of the plans was raised indirectly in several common-law copyright
cases that addressed whether an architect's plans were published, and his common-law
copyright, therefore, divested, by the building of a structure from the plans. Katz, supra
note 2, at 232-33; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 468-70. There were, however, some
exceptions to these limitations. Under the 1909 Act it was possible to classify some archi-
tectural designs, such as cemetery monuments, as works of art under § 5(g). This classifi-
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Thus, there is considerable uncertainty whether the unautho-
rized use of plans to construct a building constitutes
infringement.49
This uncertainty can be illustrated by examining two opin-
ions that addressed architects' rights in copyrighted plans. In
Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox,50 the plaintiff had copyrighted
plans for a split-level house marketed as its "Southern Shore"
model. The house was displayed at builders' conventions and
published in a copyrighted booklet. Maddox, who may have seen
the model at a convention, took a rough sketch of a similar
house to a draftsman who prepared plans that were used to
build a house. Scholz sued for infringement and lost on the de-
fendants' motions for summary judgment.51 The district court
relied on cases indicating that no claim for infringement is
stated if the alleged infringer uses plans to construct a building
rather than to communicate to others how that building might
be constructed.52 The court also concluded that there was no ev-
idence that plaintiff's plans had been used in the construction of
the Maddox home. 3
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to create an inference that de-
fendants had copied plaintiff's plans, although Maddox may
have seen the model home and may have been familiar with the
cation afforded the creator protection against the use of his design in building the struc-
ture depicted because under § 1(b) the copyright owner was given the exclusive right to
complete, execute, and finish his model or design for a work of art. Nonfunctional struc-
tures, such as monuments, are analogous to sculptural works and are afforded full pro-
tection. See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936); HR. REP.
No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55; STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 70. Cf. Drake Note, supra
note 17, at 82-83. In the broad area of architectural structures, however, few can be clas-
sified as works of art. See infra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
49. Compare DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962)
with Herman Frankel Org. v. Wolfe, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 819 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See also
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(definition of "copies"); N. BoORSTYN, supra note 13, § 2:25; Katz,
supra note 2, at 236, 237-39; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 84-85 (pre-1978 cases hold
that copyright in plans does not grant the right to build from plans).
50. 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967).
51. Id. at 85-86. Scholz sued Maddox and the lumber company that prepared the
plans, claiming unfair competition and copyright infringement.
52. Id. The district court cited Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), DeSilva Constr.
Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962), and Muller v. Triborough Bridge
Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), for the proposition that plans are not infringed
by the construction of a building according to them.
53. 379 F.2d at 85. There was no direct evidence of access. Id. at 86.
[Vol. 37
HeinOnline  -- 37 S. C. L. Rev.  404 1985-1986
ARCHITECTURAL COPYRIGHT
copyrighted booklet. The promotional booklet was not infringed
because it had been copyrighted in order to preserve its value as
an advertising medium; Scholz's copyright did not give it the ex-
clusive right to copy the plans in that brochure. 4 In dictum the
court recognized that although architects might desire protec-
tion against unauthorized use of their plans, it was not certain
that copyright afforded such protection. 5
Similar facts were presented in Imperial Homes v. La-
mont." The plaintiff prepared plans for a residential home
named "Chateau" and built model homes that were open to the
public. It also prepared an uncopyrighted promotional brochure
containing the model's floor plan.57 Defendants visited a model,
made detailed observations and measurements, and then con-
structed a duplicate home. Imperial sued for infringement. Con-
flicting evidence was presented concerning whether the defend-
ant had obtained the brochure and copied the plans, but the
trial court ruled that the plaintiff had waived its copyright pro-
tection by reproducing the floor plan in its unprotected
brochure. 8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
concluding that plaintiff had not abandoned copyright protec-
tion.5 9 The court stated, however, that copyright granted an ar-
54. Id. at 86-87.
55. Id. at 85-86. The court acknowledged that this uncertainty resulted from the
decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), but did not decide how that decision
affected the scope of protection available to copyrighted blueprints. See infra notes 72-
81 and accompanying text.
56. 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972).
57. Id. at 896. The architectural drawings were copyrighted, but the promotional
brochure, containing only the floor plan from the complete set of architectural drawings,
was not protected, despite its statement that plaintiff claimed copyright to the plans.
58. Id. at 896-98. The defendants' home was intended to resemble plaintiff's "Cha-
teau" model. The trial court determined that the Lamonts obtained a copy of the bro-
chure, but declined to rule on whether they had copied the floor plan from the brochure.
Defendants were never shown the complete drawings for the "Chateau," and there was
no evidence of access to those complete copyrighted plans. Id. at 897.
59. Id. at 898-99. The publication of the brochure did not establish abandonment
because it expressly stated that the floor plan was the subject of copyright. Id. at 898.
The court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's determination in Scholz Homes that copy-
ing the plans from the brochure would not infringe because the brochure was copy-
righted to preserve its value as an advertising medium. See supra note 54 and accompa-
nying text. The Lamont court refused to limit the scope of copyright so narrowly as to
undermine the economic philosophy of copyright and noted, by analogy, that an author's
publication of extracts from a book in order to advertise and promote it does not excuse
1986]
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chitect no rights in the concept of constructing a home with
2x4s, a pitched roof, and a slab foundation. Copyright, the court
explained, does not clothe an architect with exclusive rights to
reproduce the building pictured in his plans, but does establish
the exclusive right to reproduce plans to instruct a builder on
how to proceed.60 The court, therefore, concluded:
[W]e do not hold that the Lamonts were in anywise restricted
by the existence of Imperial's copyright from reproducing a
substantially identical residential dwelling. All we hold is that
if copyrighted architectural drawings of the originator of such
plans are imitated or transcribed in whole or in part, infringe-
ment occurs.61
The court remanded for a determination of whether defendants
had copied plans from Imperial's booklet. Thus, the court ruled
that plans are not infringed by the construction of a building
substantially similar to the one depicted so long as the imitator
does not copy the plans themselves. It did not, however, explic-
itly sanction the unauthorized use of plans.2
1. The Impact of Baker v. Selden on the Right to Control
Use
The Scholz Homes and Lamont opinions both relied on the
Supreme Court's venerable decision in Baker v. Selden, 3 which
has had a strong impact on the scope of copyright protection
the piracy of those extracts. 458 F.2d at 899.
60. Id. at 899. These statements, made in the court's discussion of Baker v. Selden,
arguably imply that copyright does not encompass the right to build. Cornell Note,
supra note 3, at 85.
61. 458 F.2d at 899.
62. Contra Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 84-85. Professor Nimmer has also asserted
that the Lamont decision held that copyright does not prohibit the construction of a
building based on copyrighted plans. 1 M NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-108.1
n.176. If he meant that the decision sanctioned unauthorized use of plans, then he was
reading too much into the opinion. On the other hand, Nimmer was correct if he meant
that the decision recognized that the construction of a building substantially similar to
one depicted in protected plans does not infringe so long as those plans are not used or
reproduced. That activity is merely the independent creation of similar plans in order to
construct a similar building. The primary concern in Lamont was whether defendants
had copied plaintiff's protected plans in order to construct a similar dwelling. If they
had, then a finding of infringement would have been appropriate on remand.
63. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See also N. BooRsTYN, supra note 13, § 2:25; Cal. Comment,
supra note 1, at 475-76; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 85.
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afforded to blueprints. In Baker the alleged infringement was of
a book that explained a bookkeeping system and contained
blank accounting forms. The defendant's book described a simi-
lar system, and it contained similar blank forms. The parties'
systems thus achieved the same results, but with different expla-
nations.6 The Supreme Court ruled for the defendant and
stated that copyright does not give an author exclusive rights to
the art, idea, or system explained in his work; 5 rather, copyright
protects only the expression of an idea. Accordingly, even
though the systems and the results were similar, Selden's rights
were not infringed because the parties' explanations and the lay-
outs of their respective forms were different.6
Baker is often cited for the principle that copyright does
not extend to ideas, systems, facts, or concepts;67 the Court's
rambling opinion, however, has also been expansively inter-
preted to establish other propositions. It contained language, for
example, that appeared to sanction the copying of the plaintiff's
forms insofar as they were necessary for the use of the unpro-
tectible system. The Court stated that the object of publishing
the book was to communicate the useful knowledge it contained
and that object would be frustrated if this knowledge could not
be used without fear of infringement. 8 The Court observed:
[W]here the art it teaches cannot be used without employing
the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such
as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be
considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given there-
with to the public; not given for the purpose of publication in
other works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of prac-
tical application.6 9
The Court thus drew a distinction between copying for explana-
tion and copying for use.
64. 101 U.S. at 100.
65. Id. at 101.
66. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)(restrictive interpretation of Baker;
see infra note 120). See also Scholz Homes v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 86 n.1 (6th Cir.
1967).
67. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). See also 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1982).
68. 101 U.S. at 102-03. See also Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 173; Cornell Note, supra
note 3, at 85.
69. 101 U.S. at 103.
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This language undermines the proposition that an archi-
tect's copyright protects against the unauthorized use of his
plans to erect a structure. A primary object of preparing
blueprints is to indicate how the structure should be built;
blueprints are meant to be applied and that object would be
frustrated if the art they teach could not be used without in-
fringement.70 Accordingly, commentators have argued that while
unauthorized two-dimensional reproduction of plans for the pur-
pose of explanation and distribution constitutes an infringe-
ment, the unauthorized use of plans to erect a building should
not infringe because this would give the architect exclusive
rights over the art disclosed by his plans in violation of the prin-
ciples announced in Baker. Under this view, an architect should
not be able to control the use of his plans in the building of a
structure.
7 1
Baker's broad language has led to uncertainty among lower
courts.7 2 One court suggested excluding architectural plans from
the scope of Baker's holding73 because specific plans do not
teach the art of architecture in the same way that the plaintiff's
book in Baker taught the art of bookkeeping and, thus, plans are
not necessary incidents to the art and are not given to the public
for the purpose of practical application. 4 Other courts have read
Baker more broadly and have refused to recognize any remedy
for the unauthorized use of plans unless the plaintiff establishes
70. Cf. DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 193-96 (M.D. Fla. 1962);
Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 476.
71. N. BoonsrvN, supra note 13, § 2:25; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D][2], at
2-108; STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 69-71; Heimuth, supra note 1, at 173; Cal. Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 476; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 85. See, e.g. Schuchart &
Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 935, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1982). Cf. Scholz
Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 85-86 (6th Cir. 1967).
72. See, e.g., Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox,, 379 F.2d 84, 85-86 (6th Cir. 1967)(as-
suming plans are to be treated in the same way as a book on science; see supra notes 50-
55 and accompanying text). Some courts have stated that articles intended for practical
use are not copyrightable. See e.g., Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 911
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost
Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944). Since most plans
are intended for practical use, this approach to copyrightability would deprive blueprints
of protection.
73. Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 85-86 (6th Cir. 1967); see supra
notes 50-55 and accompanying text. The Scholz court stated that difficulties might be
avoided by arguing that plans should be treated differently from books, an approach
rendering Baker's principles inapplicable. Id. at 86.
74. Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 477-78. See also supra note 72.
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actual duplication of the plans.
In Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority,75 for instance,
the plaintiff alleged that his copyrighted bridge approach plans
had been unlawfully appropriated and used in designing, plan-
ning, and constructing the approach to the Cross Bay Parkway
Bridge. The court held that Muller's system of loops, ramps, via-
ducts, and traffic lanes, which relieved congestion, was not copy-
rightable even though it was explained in his copyrighted draw-
ings. The court found that defendant's engineers had
independently conceived and executed their design,76 but added
that, because of Baker's principles, plaintiff would have been
without a remedy even if defendant had actually used the copy-
righted plans in designing and constructing its approach."
Similarly, in DeSilva Construction Corporation v. Her-
rald, 7  a district court stated that "[t]he protection extended by
Congress to the proprietor of a copyright in architectural plans
does not encompass the protection of the buildings or structures
themselves, but it is limited only to the plans. '7 9 The court
added that an architect does not have an exclusive right to build
the structure embodied in his technical drawings; rather, protec-
tion is limited to the unauthorized copying of the original plans
themselves ° and does not extend to the unauthorized use of
plans in building a structure."'
75. 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
76. Id. at 299-300. Plaintiff referred to the system embodied in his copyrighted
drawings as his "invention," but his copyright could not prevent the use of that system
in the defendant's approach. Id. at 300. The court found considerable similarity between
the designs, but concluded that there was no actual appropriation and that defendant's
engineers independently conceived and executed their bridge approach from other
sources and prior experience. Id. at 299.
77. Id. at 299-300 (citing Baker, 101 U.S. at 99). The court suggested that Muller
could not prevent the use of his drawings in the construction of the approach. Id. at 299.
See also STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 69-70. The court could have stated only that
Muller's copyright on his drawings did not protect against reproduction and use of the
unprotectible system that they disclosed; it need not have added that Muller was with-
out a remedy even assuming defendant's use of his drawings. See infra notes 82-120 and
accompanying text.
78. 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962)(plaintiff's plans for a ranch style house were
allegedly infringed).
79. Id. at 195.
80. Id. at 195-96 (citing H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY
396 (1944)).
81. Id. at 196. Cf. Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 941
(W.D. Tex. 1982); N. Boorstyn, supra note 13, § 2:25; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 85;
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2. Limiting the Impact of Baker v. Selden
Because the value of architectural plans depends in part on
control over the right to build, the application of Baker that
treats architectural plans like the forms appended to Selden's
book renders copyright protection almost meaningless unless the
architect can mass market his blueprints.2 As noted above,83 the
unauthorized use of plans is as damaging to an architect's crea-
tive and economic interests as is their unauthorized duplication
in copies. Moreover, it is possible to protect the public's right to
use the ideas and design concepts disclosed in copyrighted
blueprints without permitting the unfettered use of plans to
build the structures they portray. Thus, while concern over ex-
tending copyright protection to an art or concept is legitimate,8 4
an exclusive right to build from or use copyrighted plans may be
recognized as part of the reproduction right without any risk of
monopolizing ideas, systems, and design concepts.
An architect's need for exclusive control over the use of his
plans was recognized, to some extent, in two district court cases
initiated by the same plaintiff. In Herman Frankel Organization
v. Tegman, 5 the defendants, desiring a house like plaintiff's
"Shorewood" model, hired a draftsman who reproduced plain-
tiff's copyrighted, abridged floor plan as published in a brochure
obtained from a building company. The court treated the
abridged floor plan as a protected derivative work adapted from
plaintiff's full set of copyrighted plans and found that the plans
for defendant's home had clearly been taken from plaintiff's pro-
tected plan.86 Interpreting Baker, the court distinguished be-
STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 91. The DeSilva discussion of the right to control use was
made in the context of determining whether the construction and display of a model
house constituted a publication of the plans that terminated coximon-law copyright pro-
tection. The court concluded that since building a structure from plans did not infringe
the plans, because the structure is not a copy of the plans, then building a structure was
not a publication. 213 F. Supp. at 195-96. The court found, however, that other actions
of plaintiff's president amounted to a voluntary abandonment of its common-law copy-
right to the plans. Id. at 196-97. See also Katz, supra note 2, at 236; Cal. Comment,
supra note 1, at 468-70.
82. 101 U.S. at 103. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. Cf. Cal. Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 476-78; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 84-85, 95, 97.
83. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
84. Cf. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.18[B], at 2-198 to -199.
85. 367 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
86. Id. at 1052-53. The defendants admitted that their plans were substantially a
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tween reproducing copyrighted material and merely using the
knowledge taught by copyrighted material.8 7 The court found
this distinction important because
[a] person cannot, by copyrighting plans, prevent the building
of a house similar to that taught by the copyrighted plans. One
does not gain a monopoly on the ideas expressed in the copy-
righted material by the act of registering them for copyright. A
person should, however, be able to prevent another from copy-
ing copyrighted house-plans and using them to build the
house."8
After summarizing the Lamont case,8 9 the Tegman court deter-
mined that plaintiff had not abandoned its copyright9" and con-
cluded that defendants had infringed. A key factor in this deci-
sion was defendants admission that they had copied the floor
plan from plaintiff's protected brochure in order to prepare
plans and to construct a similar dwelling.9 1 Tegman thus pro-
tected the copyright owner against the unauthorized reproduc-
tion and use of its plans without giving it a monopoly over the
ideas and design concepts expressed in that protected work.92
In Herman Frankel Organization v. Wolfe,95 the same judge
reached a similar result. Defendants obtained a brochure con-
taining a copy of the floor plan to plaintiff's "Fairmont" model
copy of plaintiff's floor plan. Id. at 1052.
87. Id. at 1053. The Tegman court construed Baker to hold that the use of the
system of bookkeeping taught by the plaintiff's copyrighted work was not an infringe-
ment because the Copyright Act is not a patent act. It also found that the Supreme
Court did not hold that copies could be made of Selden's book without infringing. Id. at
1053.
88. Id. (emphasis added). The court seemed to be announcing the basic principle
that copyright in plans does not protect the idea they disclose, but, rather, it protects
against constructing a building based upon the protected plans. Cf. 1 M. NIMIIER, supra
note 6, § 2.08[D] [a], at 2-108.1 n.179; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 84 & n.29.
89. 367 F. Supp. at 1053 (discussing Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895
(5th Cir. 1972)). Lamont was important because it also concerned the alleged copying of
a floor plan publicized in a brochure. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
90. 367 F. Supp. at 1053-54 (citing Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895
(5th Cir. 1972) and distinguishing Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir.
1967); both cases concerned brochures containing floor plans; see supra notes 50-62 and
accompanying text).
91. 367 F. Supp. at 1053-54. The complaint against the persons for whom the house
was built was dismissed because they played no role in copying the plans. A builder and
a draftsman were liable. Id. at 1054.
92. Id. at 1054. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-108 n.179.
93. 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 819 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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and gave it to a builder who then, without permission, obtained
plaintiff's copyrighted working floor plans and elevations. These
plans and the brochure were given to a designer for the purpose
of making working drawings for the foundation and the floor
plan.9 4 Plaintiff sued for infringement and obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction halting construction of the defendants' partially
completed house. This injunction was eventually dissolved after
defendants made substantial changes in their plans, but the
court awarded damages and ordered defendants to surrender all
drawings made from plaintiff's plans. The court concluded that
the first set of plans prepared by defendants was copied from
plaintiff's plans and that defendants intended plaintiff's copy-
righted plans to be used as the basis for the home they were
constructing.9 5 Thus, this decision, like Tegman, prohibited the
unauthorized copying and use of the plaintiff's plans without
contravening the principle that copyright does not extend to the
ideas, systems, or discoveries expressed in a protected work.96
Thus, a proper interpretation of Baker would merely recog-
nize the proposition that copyright does not protect ideas, con-
cepts, and systems. 7 The broad reading of Baker, as applied in
Muller and DeSilva,9 8 should be discarded. The Supreme Court
in Baker was responding to Selden's contention that his copy-
right gave him an exclusive right to the use of his forms and,
94. Id. at 820.
95. Id. at 821 (citing Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053
(E.D. Mich. 1973)). See also Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Servs., Inc., 476
F.2d 386, 390-93 (8th Cir. 1973)(concept of T-shaped building not protectible, but de-
tailed plans of a specific building are copyrightable; the observation of the completed
structure does not excuse the copying or use of its plans without permission; since the
defendants' unauthorized structure was substantially completed, injunctive relief was not
appropriate, but plaintiff was allowed to amend its complaint to seek damages). See also
MacMillan Co. v. I.V.O.W. Corp., 495 F.Supp 1134, 1145-56 (D. Vt. 1980)(defendant
given plans on the tacit understanding that they were to be used only if plaintiff was
awarded the contract; instead the plans were given to another company for use in design-
ing the project).
96. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)(the Supreme Court's narrow
view of Baker's holding; see infra note 120); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1982).
97. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251-52 (3d Cir. 1983); Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox,
379 F.2d 84, 86 n.1 (6th Cir. 1967); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.18[D]. It is also
possible to distinguish Baker by arguing that plans do not teach the art of architecture
in the same way that Selden's book taught a bookkeeping system. Scholz Homes, 379
F.2d at 86; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 477.
98. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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thus, to the use of the system described in his book. 9 The Court
was concerned that the copyright monopoly might be construed
to grant an exclusive right to use of a system-a right that can
be conferred only by a patent. 00 The Court held that the plain-
tiff's copyright could not protect the art described in his work
and ruled for the defendant because the parties' respective
forms and their explanations of the system were different. 10
Accordingly, the rule established by Baker should simply
mean that an architect has no exclusive rights to the design
ideas, concepts, and methods of construction disclosed in his
copyrighted plans.0 2 Thus, any architect is free to design an
1800 square foot frame home with a slab foundation, two bath-
rooms, a garage, and a pitched roof. 0 3 This basic limitation on
copyright, however, does not restrict the architect's exclusive
right to reproduce copies of his plans for that home.0 Unautho-
rized copying that occurs in explaining an idea or system consti-
tutes infringement. 0 5 Thusjif a person likes a recently con-
structed home and somehow obtains a set of plans and copies
99. 101 U.S. at 100. The defendant's book and forms were, in fact, different from
plaintiff's.
100. Id. at 103. Selden sought protection for his methods and diagrams. Such pro-
tection would have granted a monopoly in the underlying art "when no examination of
its novelty has ever been officially made." The Court stated that this would work a sur-
prise and fraud on the public. Id.
101. Id. at 104-05. Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Scholz Homes, Inc.
v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 86 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1967).
102. Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251-52 (3d Cir. 1983); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1982).
103. Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Servs., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 390 (8th Cir.
1973); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972). Cf. Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954); Ga-On Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 183, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Copyrightability-Works Not Copyrightable-Ideas,
N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-F9 (Nov. 8, 1984), reprinted in 1985 COPYRIGHT L. DEC.
(CCH) T 25,753.
104. Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Servs., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 393 (8th Cir.
1973); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972). In Baker v.
Selden, the Court stated:
[T]he rules and methods of useful art have their final end in application and
use; and this application and use are what the public derive from the publica-
tion of a book which teaches them. But as embodied and taught in a literary
composition or book, their essence consists only in their statement. This alone
is what is secured by the copyright. The use by another of the same methods of
statement, whether in words or illustrations, in a book published for teaching
the art, would, undoubtedly, be an infringement of the copyright.
101 U.S. at 103.
105. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.18[B], at 2-199.
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them in order to explain to a builder how to construct a similar
dwelling, an infringement has occurred.110
Furthermore, reproduction of the plans in two-dimensional
copies should not be required for a finding of infringement; the
unauthorized use of plans to build a structure should result in
copyright liability. The fundamental principle that copyright
does not protect ideas would not be offended by holding a
builder liable for using plans without permission to erect a
structure. The builder's right to copy and use the ideas and de-
sign concepts revealed in a set of protected plans does not jus-
tify the actual use of those plans. In order to use such concepts
and ideas, a builder should have to prepare his own set of
blueprints independently or seek permission from the copyright
owner to use the original plans.10 7
The distinction made in Baker between copying for expla-
nation and copying for use is an awkward one'08 and has not
been reviewed by the Supreme Court for over a century. 0 9 It is
ludicrous to conclude that an architect's copyright is not vio-
lated when his plans are used without his consent, while holding
that the unauthorized reproduction of plans to make another set
of plans constitutes infringement. Both forms of misconduct ap-
propriate not only the architect's ideas, but his protected ex-
pression as well, and both cause substantially the same harm to
the architect's creative and economic interests. In both situa-
106. See, e.g., Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972); Ait-
ken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb.
1982); Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 94, 96-97 (also explaining the economic rationale
for protection).
107. Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251-53
(3d Cir. 1983). Contra Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 299-300
(S.D.N.Y. 1942). In Muller plaintiff had no right to stop defendant from using his sys-
tem, but defendant's designers should not have been allowed to employ his plans in or-
der to use his system. See supra notes 75-77.
108. Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251-53
(3d Cir. 1983). Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 477-78; Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 173;
Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 97; contra Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F.
Supp. 928, 941 (W.D. Tex 1982). Most of the reported cases have concerned allegations
of unauthorized copying and unauthorized use of the copied plans to construct a build-
ing. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Servs., Inc., 476 F.2d 386 (8th Cir.
1973); Ga-On Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183 (M.D. Fla.
1973). See also infra notes 137-201 and accompanying text.
109. Cf. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517,
526 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.18[C].
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tions, the plans aid builders who are unwilling to pay for an ar-
chitect's services. To deny the architect the right to control the
use of his plans deprives him of the right to profit from his own
labor and makes his "writing" free for the taking."l 0 Thus, the
architect's right to recover should not turn upon whether the de-
fendant reproduces an architect's plans on a photocopying ma-
chine or has them adapted by a draftsman before using them to
erect the building they depict. The use versus explanation dis-
tinction is without substance.111
Moreover, the argument that the unauthorized use of plans
to erect a building does not infringe because the structure is not
a "copy" or a reproduction of the plans 112 does not withstand
analysis. The common understanding of "copy" is a reproduc-
tion or duplication that "comes so near to the original as to give
every person seeing it the idea created by the original."1113 An
architect's plans represent how the completed structure will ap-
pear. Conversely, the structure gives the person seeing it the
idea created by the plans-a client will recognize the structure
110. See Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 95, 97. Cf. Katz, supra note 2, at 233-34; Cal.
Comment, supra note 1, at 462-70 (both discussing why the filing of plans and the erec-
tion of the structure they depict should not be regarded as publications divestive of com-
mon-law copyright); Krahmer v. Luing, 127 N.J. Super. 270, 317 A.2d 96 (Ch. Div. 1974).
The awkwardness of the use versus explanation distinction is shown by MacMillan Co. v.
I.V.O.W. Corp., 495 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1980). See also Joseph J. Legat Architects,
P.C. v. United States Dev. Corp., 29 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 609 (N.D.
Ill. 1985)(federal subject matter jurisdiction exists for infringement claim against devel-
oper who allegedly repudiated a contract with an architectural firm, placed another
firm's name on the plaintiff's plans for an apartment complex, and then used those plans
to obtain financing and to build the project). Contra Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve
Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 933, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1982)(when plaintiff established that some-
one had copied its plans, but there was no evidence that one particular defendant had
reproduced them, defendant could not be charged with infringement, even if it had used
the copied plans, because use cannot form the basis for infringement).
111. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251-53
(3d Cir. 1983). 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.18[C][2].
112. See DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 193-96 (M.D. Fla.
1962). A structure is the result of plans, not a copy, and blueprints are copied only by
their reproduction into similar technical drawings. Katz, supra note 2, at 236. This pro-
position is reasonable for dealing with the issue of whether construction of building is a
publication that divests the architect of his common-law copyright in the plans. See
Krahmer v. Luing, 127 N.J. Super. 270, 317 A.2d 96 (Ch. Div. 1974); Edgar H. Woods
Assocs., Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886 (1964). It does not, however, war-
rant the conclusion that the unauthorized use of plans is permissible.
113. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908).
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as the three-dimensional reproduction of the plans.14 Further-
more, the Copyright Act grants the copyright owner the exclu-
sive right to reproduce his work in copies," 5 which, as defined in
the Act, include not only two-dimensional plans and drawings,
but also completed structures derived from those plans and
drawings." 6 Copyright prohibits copying in any medium, and
subject to the Act's useful article limitations, no fundamental
principles are offended by ruling that plans are infringed when
they are used-that is, copied into a structure-without
authorization." 7
Both Baker and section 102(b) of the Act make it clear that
the copyright monopoly cannot extend to ideas, discoveries,
methods, and systems regardless of how they are expressed.
There is nothing in copyright law, however, that justifies the
proposition that copying for use, versus copying for explanation,
is not an infringement. The Act proscribes reproduction without
qualification; it does not immunize use."" No risk of monopoliz-
ing unprotectible ideas or methods of construction would result
from recognizing that the unauthorized use of copyrighted plans
to construct a building constitutes infringement. In view of the
wide variety of ways that ideas contained in blueprints can be
114. Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 478-79. See also King Features Syndication v.
Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924)("A copy is that which ordinary observation
would cause to be recognized as having been taken from or the reproduction of
another.").
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
116. Id. § 101 (" 'copies' are material objects ... in which a work is fixed by any
method. . . and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."). In addition, a struc-
ture can be viewed as derivative of or adapted from copyrighted plans and, therefore,
within the copyright owner's exclusive right to prepare derivative works. Id. § 106(2).
See id. § 101 (definition of "derivative work"); Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 97 & n.121.
An architect also could attempt to show that the defendant's completed structure was
copied from the architect's graphic rendition or scale model. Anyone viewing the finished
building would then see a "copy" of the architect's design or model. See, e.g. Jones Bros.
v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936). Models are copyrightable under 17
U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5), 101 (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works")(1982),
but the Act's "useful article" limitations restrict the scope of protection afforded to the
completed structure. See infra notes 151-84 and accompanying text.
117. Cf. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-108 & n. 176; 2 M. NIMMER, §
8.01[B]; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 479; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 97.
118. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251-53 (3d
Cir. 1983). 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.18[C][2], at 2-202. Contra Schuchart & As-
socs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
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expressed by an architect, it is erroneous to conclude that a
comparable dwelling can be constructed only by the use of one
particular set of copyrighted blueprints.119 There is no justifica-
tion for allowing a person who wants to construct a building sim-
ilar to one portrayed in and erected in conformity with copy-
righted plans to use those plans freely or to reproduce them in
two-dimensional copies. Thus, in accordance with Baker and the
Act itself, a person is free to use the architect's unprotectible
ideas and concepts, but should not be allowed to use the archi-
tect's protectible expression.11°
IV. THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF STRUCTURES
The protection that copyright gives completed structures is
even less certain than that afforded to the unauthorized repro-
duction and use of plans. 12 1 At issue is whether an architect can
prevent a person with sufficient drafting skills from copying the
exterior and interior designs of a building and then erecting a
substantially similar structure. Under existing law, copyright
may not grant architects an exclusive right to reproduce the
structures erected from their protected blueprints 22  even
119. Cf. Ga-On Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 185
(M.D. Fla. 1973). Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1251-53 (3d Cir. 1983)
120. Cf. MacMillan Co. v. I.V.O.W. Corp., 495 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1980); see
supra note 110. In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme Court interpreted
Baker to hold that copying an idea without copying the expression does not infringe and
found that a statuette was copyrightable even though it was intended to be mass-pro-
duced and used as a lamp base. Id. at 217. This interpretation implies that the distinc-
tion between copying for use versus explanation is dictum that will not be followed. 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.18[D], at 2-206. See Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 477-78;
Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 95, 97.
121. Katz, supra note 2, at 237 (also noting that most countries, including England,
provide copyright protection for structures). See also Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 180-87
(discussing the protection afforded to structures in several European nations); Cornell
Note, supra note 3, at 85-86; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 480-84 (discussing the
possibility of classifying architectural creations as works of art). Cf. STUDY No. 27, supra
note 2, at 70, 75-76.
122. An architect's copyright on plans does not prevent a person from constructing a
substantially identical dwelling. Cf. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899
(5th Cir. 1972). See also Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 941
(W.D. Tex. 1982); Comment, Copyright Protection for Architectural Structures, 2
U.S.F.L. REv. 320, 321 (1968)[hereinafter cited as U.S.F. Comment]; Herman Frankel
Org., Inc. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Edgar H. Wood Assocs.,
Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886 (1964); Krahmer v. Luing, 127 N.J. Super.
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though such protection would provide an additional incentive
for architects to create.123
The United States, unlike several European nations, does
not explicitly afford protection to the designs of completed
structures.124 In a 1961 report, the Register of Copyrights recom-
mended against extending protection to the design of functional
architectural structures because of the difficulty in distinguish-
ing between the functional and artistic features of a design. 125 It
is not clear, however, whether the 1976 Copyright Act incorpo-
rated the Register's suggestions. The Act states that "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works" are copyrightable1 6 and defines
this category as two- or three-dimensional works "of fine,
graphic, and applied art. . . technical drawings, diagrams, and
models. '127 Further, copyright includes the exclusive right to
reproduce the protected work in "copies, ' 128 which are defined
as material objects "in which a work is fixed by any method...
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced or other-
wise communicated .... ,2 Since a structure is a copy of its
blueprints just as a statue is a copy of a sculptor's drawings or
model for that work of art,3 0 the terms of the 1976 Act do not
270, 317 A.2d 961 (Ch. Div. 1974). But see Jones v. Spindel, 122 Ga. App. 390, 177 S.E.2d
187 (1970).
123. A set of plans might be marketable, but if the resulting structure can be copied
freely after it is erected, then the architect is deprived of the business of those who want
a similar structure. Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 95-96.
124. See STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 73-74; Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 273-74;
supra note 121. See also infra notes 251-64 and accompanying text.
125. HOUSE JUDICIARY Comm., 87TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REvISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 15-16[hereinafter
cited as REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS], reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT
1199 (1961); Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 176-77; U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 324.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1982).
127. Id. § 101 (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). See also Cal.
Comment, supra note 1, at 480-82 (arguing that some architectural creations could be
classified as works of art under the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1973)).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1982).
129. Id. § 101 (1982)(definition of "copies").
130. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text. See also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201 (1954)(artistic reproduction of a dancing human figure used as a lamp base
copyrightable and infringed by defendant's reproduction of that figure). Cf. Letter Edged
in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Building Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ill.
1970)(monumental statue copyrightable); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp.
729 (M.D. Pa. 1936)(plaintiff's memorial was copyrightable as a design for a work of art
and was infringed by defendant's memorial). See also Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 173-74,
177-78; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 479, 481-82; supra notes 112-17 and accompany-
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foreclose copyright protection for structures. 131
An architect's rights in the design of a functional structure,
however, are not coextensive with a sculptor's rights to control
reproductions and adaptations of his statuary. The Copyright
Act reflects a strong policy against the monopolization of ideas
in two places: the idea/expression dichotomy 3 2 and the limita-
tions on the protection afforded to useful articles.133 These limi-
tations represent an attempt to prevent any monopolization of
the functional and utilitarian features incorporated into a work
of authorship.1 3 4 Accordingly, if a building is functional, there
may be only a few aspects of it that are protectible. It would be
difficult to show that the construction of a substantially similar
dwelling constituted infringement unless the defendant had re-
produced or used the architect's plans. 35 If few aspects of the
design of a building are copyrightable, there is nothing to stop a
skilled draftsman from carefully scrutinizing and sketching a
structure to prepare his own plans for the construction of a sub-
stantially similar building."3 "
A. An Architect's Unprotectible Ideas
It is well established that ideas are not protectible; only the
ing text. Contra Katz, supra note 2, at 236 (stating that a structure is the result of plans,
not a copy of them; this statement was made, however, in arguing that the erection of a
building should not be regarded as a general publication of the plans that is divestive of
the architect's common-law copyright).
131. See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55; infra text accompanying
notes 223-32.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). See also Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d
895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972); Herman Frankel Org., Inc. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053
(E.D. Mich. 1973)(Baker permitted the system to be copied, but it did not permit copies
to be made of the book).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
See infra notes 151-84 and accompanying text.
134. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copy-
right in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. Rpv. 707, 742 & n.165 (1983). Cf. Cal. Comment,
supra note 1, at 482-84.
135. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972); Hellmuth,
supra note 1, at 173-74. According to Professor Nimmer, the Lamont decision held that
copyright does not prohibit the construction of a building based on copyrighted plans. 1
M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-108.1 n.176. For a discussion of his interpreta-
tion, see supra note 62.
136. Cf. 1 M. NIMmER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-108.2; Krahmer v. Luing, 127
N.J. Super. 270, 276, 317 A.2d 96, 98-99 (Ch. Div. 1974); Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at
479; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 85-86; U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 321.
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author's original expression of ideas is copyrightable.1 37 This
fundamental principle defines and limits the protectible ele-
ments of a structure in the same way that it limits the scope of
protection afforded to any work of authorship.13s If an architect
had exclusive rights to methods of construction or to design con-
cepts, then he could prevent others from creating variations on
those concepts and methods.139 This type of control by the ar-
chitect would contravene copyright's objective of encouraging
the production of works of authorship for public benefit. 40
Thus, general design ideas and concepts expressed in a building
are not protectible and can be copied freely from casual observa-
tion. On the other hand, the detailed plans and drawings of a
specific building are copyrightable."1
This dichotomy may defeat an architect's claim of infringe-
ment even if he establishes that the defendant had access to and
used his copyrighted plans or deliberately imitated general as-
pects of his completed structure. A general impression of simi-
larity between structures resulting from the similarity of ideas
does not state a case of infringement. 42 In Wickham v. Knox-
137. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
138. See generally Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218
(1985); id. at 2241-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. For example, the idea of a tower with an enclosed structure on top is not copy-
rightable. Similarly, an architect cannot monopolize the idea of constructing a T-shaped
building or a house erected with 2x4s, a pitched roof, and a slab foundation. See Wick-
ham v. Knoxville Int'l. Energy Exposition, Inc., 739 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1984); Nucor
Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Servs., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 390 (8th Cir. 1973); Imperial
Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972). Cf. Copyrightability-Works
Not Copyrightable-Ideas, N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-F9 (Nov. 8, 1984), reprinted in
1985 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 25,753.
140. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Cf. Abrams, supra note 9, at 510. It is very common for
architects to draw on the ideas of other designers. Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 91-94.
Helmut Jahn's Illinois Center, for example, draws upon the geometry of I. M. Pei and
Edward Larrabee Barnes, the office atrium used by Kevin Roche, the glass-enclosed ele-
vators of John Portman, and the use of color by the firm Arquitectonia. The Battle of
"Starship Chicago," TIME MAGAZINE, February 4, 1985, at 84. These are unprotectible
ideas and concepts.
141. For example, a modern home in America could not be built without bedrooms,
bath, kitchen, and family room-necessities that are not copyrightable. An architect's
particular arrangement of these rooms, however, results in an appealing, salable product
that should be copyrightable. Cf. Ga-On Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See also Nucor Corp. v. Tenn. Forging Steel
Servs., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 390; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 468-69.
142. In order to recover in an infringement action, the plaintiff must prove that he
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vile International Energy Exposition, Inc.,145 for example, the
plaintiff alleged that defendants had used and infringed the ar-
chitect's copyrighted drawings for the "Tower of Power" in or-
der to design and build the "Sunsphere," the central theme
structure of the 1982 World's Fair in Knoxville. 144 According to
the plaintiff, the architect had prepared two different renderings
of his tower and turned over his copyrighted drawings to one of
the defendants in 1977. These works were then allegedly fur-
nished to and used by another architectural and engineering
firm.
14 5
The defendants contended that there was no substantial
similarity between the respective works and moved for summary
judgment. 46 The district court agreed because it was "impressed
by the virtual absence of any similarity between. . . [the] struc-
tural designs." 47 Each rendition depicted enclosed buildings on
top of elevated towers. One of the plaintiff's two designs was a
spherical building similar to defendants' "Sunsphere," but there
were differences in the bases, the enclosed buildings, and the
dimensions and proportions of the parties' towers. The court
stated:
Plaintiff seems to be asserting that he has the exclusive right
to design and erect a tower with a spherical building on top of
it. The use of towers in architectural designs is certainly not
unique .... Likewise the incorporation of a spherical struc-
owns the copyright and that the defendant copied his original work. Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 218 (1954); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). Absent direct evidence of copying, the plaintiff
must prove defendant's access to his work as well as similarities that demonstrate copy-
ing. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162
(9th Cir. 1977). He also must prove that the defendant copied more than the law per-
mits-that there is substantial similarity of copyrightable expression. Ideal Toy Corp. v.
Fab-Lu, Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966); 3 M. NirmsR, supra note 6, §§ 13.01,
13.02. See also Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 176
(W.D. Tex. 1983)(defendants photocopied 20 pages of plaintiff's specifications). Cf. Dur-
ham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980). No amount of proof of
access will suffice to establish copying if there are no similarities. Sid & Marty Krofft,
562 F.2d at 1172. See also infra notes 273-89 and accompanying text.
143. 555 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1984).
144. 555 F. Supp. at 155 (plaintiff was the trustee in bankruptcy for the estate of
Marc Cardoso, author of the copyrighted architectural drawings allegedly infringed).
145. Id. at 157.
146. Id. at 155.
147. Id.
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ture into the design is no more than an "idea. '148
The court concluded that there was no evidence from which a
jury could find substantial similarity.149 On appeal the Sixth Cir-
cuit, while acknowledging that summary judgment is sparingly
granted in infringement actions, affirmed because of the sub-
stantial design differences between the works and because the
'idea' of a tower structure is not copyrightable. 150
B. The Useful Article and Utilitarian Function Limitations
Copyright protects three-dimensional works of applied art,
including works of artistic craftsmanship, under the rubric of
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works."'' That protection,
however, extends only "insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.' 1 52 A related
limitation provides that the design of a useful article "shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and
only to the extent that, the design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian
aspects of the article."' 53 A useful article is defined as one "hav-
ing an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray
the appearance of the article or to convey information. An arti-
cle that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'use-
ful article.' ,,154
Courts have experienced difficulty in determining whether
148. Id. at 156.
149. Id. at 156-57.
150. 739 F.2d at 1097. See 3 MVL NiMMER, supra note 6, § 12.10. One of the defend-
ants admitted having seen a newspaper article with a sketch of plaintiff's tower, but all
denied that the sketch influenced their design and asserted that the "Sunsphere" was
their original creation, that a sunlike object was an appropriate symbol for the fair (an
energy exposition), and that economic and engineering considerations influenced their
tower design. 555 F. Supp. at 156. Despite a dispute over access and copying, summary
judgment was appropriate since there was no similarity of protectible expression.
151. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5), 101 (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works")(1982). The enumeration of works within the category is illustrative and not ex-
clusive. Id. § 101 (definition of terms "including" and "such as").
152. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
153. Id.
154. Id. (definition of "useful article"). Thus, a blueprint is not a useful article since
it functions merely to portray the article and to convey information. See supra note 18.
[Vol. 37
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particular works of authorship are useful articles and in apply-
ing the Act's separability and independence test to ascertain
whether a useful article contains any features that are copyright-
able. 155 Many articles have aesthetic as well as useful functions,
and practical use is not necessarily dominant. As a result, con-
sumer decisions to purchase items are frequently based on crite-
ria beyond mere utility; it is often important for articles to be
decorative or stylishly designed as well. 156 it has been suggested,
therefore, that in determining an article's copyrightability,
courts should consider whether its marketability is affected by
such aesthetic qualities. 157 For example, although most items of
apparel are utilitarian, particular articles are often purchased
because of the style, cut, shape, and dimensions that result from
the dress designer's artistic skills. Some people will pay a pre-
mium price for such qualities. Thus, the function of many styl-
ishly designed garments is not limited to practical use; rather,
they are purchased for decoration or to create an image. Accord-
ingly, protection would seem to be warranted. 158
Despite these arguments, dress and apparel designs gener-
ally are not copyrightable. 5 9 The Copyright Act's definition of
"useful article" employs the phrase "an intrinsic utilitarian
function" °60 in contrast to the troublesome "sole intrinsic func-
155. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[B], at 2-95. Compare Carol Barnhart, Inc. v.
Economy Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.
1985), with Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984). Compare also Kiesel-
stein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980), with Norris Indus. v.
International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818
(1983).
156. Cf. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1980); Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
157. Cf. Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984); Kieselstein-
Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 992 (2d Cir. 1980); 1 M. NiLIMER, supra
note 6, § 2.08[B], at 2-96.2 to -96.3; Denicola, supra note 134, at 731-35.
158. Cf. Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Young, Freebooters in Fashion: The Need for a Copyright in Textile and Garment De-
signs, 9 COPYRIGHT L. Symp. (ASCAP) 76, 83-84 (1958). Similarly, since a watch might be
purchased because it is attractive as well as functional, copyright protection seems ap-
propriate. Contra Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 155 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir.
1958). But see Crowley, The Register of Copyrights as an Art Critic, 11 COPYRIGHT L.
SYmp. (ASCAP) 155, 162 (1960).
159. 1 M. NrimR, supra note 6, § 2.08[H][3], at 2-125; contra Poe v. Missing Per-
sons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(definition of "useful article").
1986] 423
HeinOnline  -- 37 S. C. L. Rev.  423 1985-1986
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
tion" language contained in regulations adopted under the 1909
Act.1 61 It is, therefore, difficult to argue that items of apparel are
not useful articles.162 Further, most dress designs do not contain
any features that are physically or conceptually separable from
the article's utilitarian aspects.6 3 The design on the fabric from
which a dress is made might be copyrightable, but the design of
the dress itself is not.164
Similarly, because many people want to live and work in
buildings that are both aesthetically pleasing and functional,
they are willing to pay for an architect's professional services to
create a distinctive design. The designs of many structures
should be copyrightable because appearance and design may be
as important as function.'65 Nevertheless, the Act's barriers to
the protection of dress and apparel designs also limit copyright
protection for functional structures.'
An architect might escape the Act's useful article limita-
tions by arguing that he has created a work of art, like a piece of
sculpture.67 This argument would be successful, however, only if
161. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960). See Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 483 (arguing
that architectural creations are not solely useful; some may have dual intrinsic character-
istics of art and utility).
162. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[B], at 2-90 to 93 (discussing Esquire, Inc. v.
Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1982), and the interpretive problems stemming from the "sole intrinsic
function" phrase in 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960) versus the "an intrinsic function" lan-
guage in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(definition of "useful article")). Although utility is not
necessarily the "sole" function of many stylish garments, they do have the intrinsic utili-
tarian function of protection from unwanted exposure.
163. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[H][3], at 2-125. Cf. Norris Indus. v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983). But
see Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984)(summary judgment inappro-
priate on issue of whether plaintiff's creation was a swimsuit (a useful article) or a copy-
rightable work of conceptual art; see infra note 167).
164. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[H], at 2-124 to 126. Contra Poe v. Missing
Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
165. Cf. Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 483-84 (arguing that architectural creations
should be copyrightable as works of art because they have dual intrinsic characteristics
of art and utility).
166. Gerber, Book Review, 26 UCLA L. REV. 925, 939, 942 (1979)(reviewing M. NIM-
MER, NIhfzta ON COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 1978) and discussing Professor Nimmer's approach
to the separability test that treats structures and dress designs in the same way). See 1
M. NiMMER, supra note 6, at §§ 2.0B[D]b, 2.08[H]3.
167. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "useful article"). See, e.g., Poe v. Missing
Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984). Poe created an article that he described as an art
work in the medium of soft sculpture. It had the appearance of a swimsuit, an article of
clothing, and a photo of a person wearing his creation was used, without his consent, on
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there were no evidence to support a finding that the work had a
utilitarian function.' For instance, the designs of cemetery me-
morials and other monumental and nonfunctional structures like
the Eiffel Tower'69 are entitled to full copyright protection not-
withstanding the Act's useful article limitations.
1
'
7 0
Monuments and memorials, however, are designed primarily
to be symbols and are more akin to sculpture and other three-
dimensional works of art than to the standard products of archi-
tects' creative labors, such as homes, office buildings, shopping
centers, and apartments. These functional structures will always
be subject to the Act's useful article limitations. Most buildings
are useful articles because each has an intrinsic utilitarian func-
tion, such as shelter.' 7 ' By contrast, an architect's plans and
scale models are not useful articles because they merely depict
the real structures. Since a completed building's useful function
usually will be obvious, a judge can determine as a matter of law
whether the purpose of an architect's creation is utilitarian.172
defendant's record album cover. He sued for infringement, and the district court granted
summary judgment for defendants because Poe's creation was an uncopyrightable article
of clothing. The court of appeals, however, reversed, concluding that there was a dis-
puted issue of material fact as to whether the creation was a work of art or a swimsuit.
168. Cf. Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff's un-
contradicted evidence established that his "swimsuit" existed solely as a work of art.
There was no evidence that the article could be used as a swimsuit or that a person
wearing it could move, walk, swim, sit, or lie down without unwelcome exposure. It might
have been marketable as art even if it had no utilitarian function. Id. at 1241-42. See
supra note 167.
169. See, e.g., Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago,
320 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1970)(Picasso's monumental statue for the City of Chicago
was copyrightable, but there was a general publication divestive of common-law copy-
right protection); Jones Bros. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936); 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D][2][b], at 2-108.2.
170. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55 ("Purely nonfunctional or monumental
structures would be subject to full copyright protection."). But see Wickham v. Knox-
ville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 154, 156 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)(suggesting
that some monumental works are functional to the extent that "economic and engineer-
ing considerations" dictate the design).
171. So long as an article does not function solely to portray the appearance of an
article or to convey information, like plans or scale models, it may be considered a useful
article. N. BooRsTYN, supra note 13, § 2:25, at 77; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(definition of
"useful article"). Cf. Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L. Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir.
1983)(toy airplanes are protectible because they have no intrinsic utilitarian function
other than to portray real airplanes).
172. Cf. Norris Indus. v. International Tel. & Tel., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir.
1984)(the artist's uncontradicted evidence established that the only reason for the exis-
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Analysis must, therefore, focus on the Act's test of separa-
bility and independence; copyrightability depends on whether
any of a building's features can be identified separately from its
utilitarian aspects.173 The Register of Copyrights and the courts
have upheld the copyrightability of some artistic elements em-
bodied in utilitarian objects. As noted above, fabric designs are
protectible. 174 Similarly, copyright protection is also available for
certain personal accessories that perform utilitarian functions, 17 5
such as ornamental belt buckles.1 76 The Act's legislative history
also supports the copyrightability of design elements that can be
separated, either physically or conceptually, from a useful arti-
cle's utilitarian aspects.17 7 There has, however, been considerable
disagreement and uncertainty about the meaning and impact of
"conceptual" separability.178 Further, courts have recognized
that the aesthetic elements of some articles are so inextricably
interwoven with the item's utilitarian aspects that there are no
features that can be separated conceptually, let alone physically,
to stand alone as copyrightable works. 9 As a consequence, some
attractively designed useful articles are not copyrightable be-
cause their designs do not incorporate features that are separa-
tence of his soft sculpture swimsuit was as a work of art). In contrast, an architect's
testimony about his building's existence as a work of art could easily be contradicted.
See supra notes 167-68.
173. Cf. Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1983); H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55.
174. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Co., 173 F. Supp. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also
37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1959)(regulation promulgated by the Copyright Office to implement
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), supra note 120); 1 M. NIMhMER, supra note 6, §
2.08[B], at 2-89; H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55.
175. Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); contra
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 155 F. Supp. 932
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
176. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
177. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55. See also Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591
F.2d 796, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(Leventhal, J., concurring).
178. Compare Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419-26
(2d Cir. 1985)(Newman, J., dissenting) with 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.08[B]
[and] Gerber, supra note 166, at 938-43. Since the statute's definitions do not even men-
tion "conceptual" separability, this permissive approach to ascertaining the copyright-
able features in a useful article arguably conflicts with the Act's explicit terms. Id. at
939.
179. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal, J., con-
curring); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp. 364, 370 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
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ble and independent of their utilitarian aspects.180 Thus, if the
design of a structure contains no elements or features that are
physically or conceptually separable from that structure's utili-
tarian aspects, then nothing in that structure's design is entitled
to copyright protection."81
The Act's legislative history acknowledges that the physi-
cally or conceptually separable artistic touches that an architect
incorporates into a structure are copyrightable whether the em-
bellishments are on the building's interior or exterior.18 2 If, how-
ever, the Act's useful article limitations are interpreted restric-
tively, nothing aside from "add on" works of art will be
protectible in a functional architectural design. For example, few
if any features would be protectible in a stylish but unadorned
"Miesian" style home or office building designed by an architect
who follows the credo "less is more" or "form follows function."
"Less" means "less," and perhaps no copyright protection
should be afforded to any of the design aspects of a glass box
structure. In contrast, an architect seeking to emulate his Victo-
rian predecessors would be able to fare much better under the
Act's separability test. By embellishing the structure with ornate
carvings and decorations, he could create sculptural ornamenta-
tion that might stand alone conceptually, or perhaps even physi-
cally, from the building's utilitarian aspects and that would,
therefore, be protectible 8 3 Similarly, the gargoyles embellishing
a school building designed in an imitation gothic style would be
protectible because with some imagination they could be concep-
tually chiseled away from the structure to stand alone.8 A
180. Compare Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) with Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414
F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908, reh'g denied,-441 U.S. 917 (1979). The § 101 definition of the § 102(a)(5) category
was intended to clarify the distinction between works of applied art, which are pro-
tectible, and industrial designs, which are not. HR. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 54.
181. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 85-86.
182. For instance, protection should be available for ornamentation like the scroll-
work incorporated in the window panels on some of Louis Sullivan's office buildings, or a
stained glass window, or perhaps even original trim and molding designed by an archi-
tect and milled by a skilled artisan. Cf. HR. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55.
183. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55.
184. Cf. Denicola, supra note 134, at 716. Prior to Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954), the Register of Copyrights granted registration to stained glass windows and bas-
relief bronze doors. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Register of Copyrights at 27-28, Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). Such works should be treated as features added to a struc-
ture, which are capable of existing separately from the building's utilitarian purpose.
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school building designed in the Bauhaus style, on the other
hand, would probably have no separable features and, thus,
would not be copyrightable at all. The Act's test of separability
and independence thus affords limited copyright protection to
some architectural styles, while other styles or schools of design
are deprived of protection entirely.
V. THE CASE FOR AN EXPANSIVE DEFINITION OF THE
COPYRIGHTABLE FEATURES IN A STRUCTURE
While it is reasonable to protect the separable artistic fea-
tures added to some functional structures, architects are more
concerned in having protection for the overall appearance of
their buildings and for their arrangements of space, such as the
dimensions, configuration, and locations of rooms, halls, doors,
windows, closets, and the like. 85 They organize and arrange
spaces and shapes to create structures that function effectively
and efficiently and are aesthetically pleasing as well. s Archi-
tects produce works of authorship that are as much the product
of the creative process as any other manner of artistic output.18 7
Nevertheless, when the Act's separability test is interpreted and
applied restrictively,88 many of the important creative features
185. Cf. Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 95-96, 98-99 (protection for the overall design
is needed, but protection of individual ornamental design elements is inappropriate).
186. Far less creative effort and skill go into the preparation of many catalogues and
directories that collect, arrange, and organize unprotectible facts and data; yet such com-
pilations are copyrightable. 17 U.S.C. §§ 103(a), 101 (definition of "compilation")(1982).
See, e.g., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977); Leon v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Some decisions have prevented the
copying of the materials in a compilation by extending protection to the compiler's labor
in preparing the work. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 3.04, at 3-15. A compilation's collec-
tion of previously unavailable data is valuable, and protection affords an incentive for
the creation of such works. National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552
F. Supp. 89, 92 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In view of the importance of architecture and the great
amount of thought, technical skill, judgment, artistic effort, and plain hard work that go
into the design and execution of plans and the resulting structure, architectural works
warrant at least as much copyright protection as compilations.
187. Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 180 (citing 1 S. LADAs, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF LITERARY AND ARTIsTic PROPERTY § 101, at 223 (1938)); Cal. Comment, supra
note 1, at 481.
188. The Act's limitations on the copyrightability of useful articles are a significant
barrier to adequate protection even though the separability and independence test has
been applied inconsistently to works of applied art, such as belt buckles, wheel covers,
and mannequins, and despite the potential for manipulating the conceptual separability
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embodied in a functional structure will be unprotectible regard-
less of the originality and attractiveness of the structure's inte-
rior and exterior appearance.
Additionally, under modern interpretations, once a struc-
ture is erected, an architect cannot stop the imitation of that
structure's design if the copier does not reproduce or use his
plans or copy the structure's separable features and embellish-
ments. An individual can walk through a completed or partially
constructed dwelling, observe its design, make detailed notes
about the configuration, dimensions, and locations of rooms,
windows, and doors, and prepare his own set of plans. The cop-
ier can then use those plans to erect a substantially similar
dwelling without infringing the architect's copyright. 189 The cop-
ier has not reproduced or used the architect's protected
blueprints, but has copied the architect's design for a functional,
useful article. The former is considered an infringement, but the
latter is not.
This dichotomy constitutes a distinction without a differ-
ence. In each situation the product of an architect's creative ge-
nius has been appropriated. It is inequitable and inappropriate
to permit a person to scrutinize an existing structure in order to
reproduce it; this type of copying is no different from reproduc-
ing protected plans.190 Several cases addressing architects' com-
mon-law rights held that the erection of a building did not pub-
lish the plans and that the public did not acquire a proprietary
interest in the work from its construction and exhibition.191 Con-
struction does not indicate an architect's intent to abandon his
rights either to the plans or to "copies" of them, including the
building they portray.192 Moreover, the Act's definition of "cop-
ies" does not have to be distorted in order to treat a building as
standard. See supra notes 173-84 and accompanying text. There are few reported deci-
sions discussing the application of the separability and independence test to architec-
tural structures; thus it is necessary to analyze this problem by looking to analogous
cases addressing the copyrightability of works of applied art and industrial design.
189. Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 479; U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 320-
21; DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962).
190. Cf. Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 469.
191. Edgar H. Wood Assocs., Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 365, 197 N.E.2d 886, 894
(1964); Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 469. The erection of a structure should not be
regarded as a divestive publication; that doctrine is outmoded.
192. Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 470.
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a copy of the architect's plans. 9 ' A person should, thus, be re-
garded as an infringer when he reaps where he has not sown, 94
whether he reproduces plans in two-dimensional copies, uses
plans without authorization to build the structure they depict,
or studies an existing structure in order to prepare a set of plans
for the erection of a substantially similar structure.
The copyright law can and should be interpreted to protect
many of the design aspects of functional architectural structures
without contravening either the idea-expression dichotomy or
copyright law's related prohibition against protecting the utilita-
rian aspects of useful articles. This contention can be illustrated
through a hypothetical architectural design competition. The
contest rules state that prizes will be awarded for the five best
designs of a modestly priced, medium sized, single family home,
as judged by a panel of experts. The home must be one story
and no larger than 1800 square feet; it must have three bed-
rooms and two baths, be of frame construction, and be heated
and cooled with a heat pump. Additionally, the total cost of the
home, aside from the land, must not exceed $80,000.
There are many unprotectible architectural design ideas and
concepts that all of the contestants might employ in drawing
their own plans for this modest dwelling. Although they work
independently, there are bound to be similarities in their designs
stemming from commonly held ideas regarding the logical loca-
tions for closets, bathrooms, and kitchen. In order to keep costs
low, many of the architects may incorporate into their plans and
specifications standardized, mass-produced doors, windows,
moldings, and other details. This choice too will lead to some
similarities in their designs. Thus, many architects indepen-
dently designing an attractive and efficient home within the con-
test's guidelines may use the same ideas and concepts to com-
plete their projects, and as a result, their plans would display
several similarities. Nevertheless, these plans would be copy-
rightable because they were prepared independently without
copying.195
Assume that the five best designs are selected and model
193. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
194. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918).
195. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903); N.
BOORSTYN, supra note 13, § 2:1. See supra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 37
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homes are then built in accordance with these winning plans.
The differences and similarities between the respective copy-
rightable plans would be even more apparent once the dwellings
are erected. Despite the obvious similarities compelled by the
contest rules, differences in the exteriors and interiors should be
apparent as a result of each architect's independent efforts. In a
general sense, each dwelling functions in the same way; never-
theless, each architect resolved the design problem, employed
unprotectible ideas and concepts, and created a functional archi-
tectural design without copying his competitors' works of
authorship.
In view of the many ways in which this simple dwelling can
be designed, there are no risks in affording copyright protection
to many aspects of these functional architectural designs. Pro-
tection will not enable the copyright owner to stop other archi-
tects from independently designing structures that function in
the same way. An architect should, however, be able to prohibit
others from copying his particular manner of expression by re-
producing the design aspects of his structure, and these pro-
tectible design features should include, among other things, the
specific configuration of rooms and their dimensions, the ar-
rangement of spaces and shapes, the location of doors and win-
dows, and some of the choices of materials. These design fea-
tures should be recognized as the architect's copyrightable
expression of architectural ideas, concepts, and principles.
In essence, an architect's expression of his work of author-
ship in blueprints, plans, models, and an actual structure should
be copyrightable even though the structure itself is a functional,
utilitarian article. Thus, the architect's rights would be infringed
by the unauthorized copying or use of his plans and by the re-
production of the copyrightable aspects of a completed struc-
ture. Other architects should be free to borrow design concepts
and architectural principles to create independently other build-
ings that function like the copyright owner's structure, but the
policy favoring the free use of ideas does not warrant the appro-
priation of the architect's manner of expressing those concepts
and principles in a completed structure. The unauthorized re-
production of the design aspects of a completed, functioning
structure should be treated no differently from the unauthorized
copying or use of plans-as an infringement of the architect's
copyright.
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A. Accommodating Expanded Protection within the
Copyright Act
1. The Limitations in Section 113
The hypothetical architectural design contest posed above
illustrates that copyright can protect many of the design aspects
of functional structures, as well as separable embellishments,
without contravening the fundamental principle that ideas, sys-
tems, methods, and processes are not copyrightable.196 Further,
this approach to copyrightability can be accomplished within the
restrictions of the Copyright Act of 1976; there is no need for an
amendment to explicitly afford protection to the design of func-
tional structures.1 97
Section 113(a) of the Act provides that the exclusive right to
reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in-
cludes the right to reproduce the work in any kind of article,
whether useful or otherwise. 19 8 This section thus recognizes the
architect's exclusive right to control the reproduction of his
plans in the form of another set of plans and in the form of the
useful structure executed from those plans.199 Therefore, an ar-
chitect should be able to claim exclusive rights in the structure
subject to the Act's useful article limitations and the restrictions
in sections 113(b) and 113(c).
Section 113(c) provides:
(c) In the case of a work lawfully reproduced in useful arti-
cles that have been offered for sale or other distribution to the
public, copyright does not include any right to prevent the
making, distribution, or display of pictures or photographs of
196. See Ga-On Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA).183 (M.D.
Fla. 1973), aff'd mem., 492 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1974)(the peculiar arrangement of a
kitchen, bedroom, and family room results in a design concept that is a marketable and
copyrightable product).
197. Contra Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 81, 96-100.
198. 17 U.S.C. § 113(a). This section restates the holding of Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954). See supra note 120; N. BooRs'Y, supra note 13, § 5:10, at 143.
199. Plans are copyrightable, H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55; they are not
useful articles as defined in the Act because their intrinsic function is to convey informa-
tion on the construction of a building. 1 M. NIMhER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-105.
Rather, plans portray a useful article; thus when they are reproduced in three dimen-
sions, the resulting "copy" is a building that ordinarily has a utilitarian function. See
supra note 18.
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such articles in connection with advertisements or commenta-
ries related to the distribution or display of such articles, or in
connection with news reports.20 0
This provision does not significantly restrict an architect's rights
against those who reproduce copyrightable elements from his ex-
ecuted designs. Rather, it is a minor limitation that prevents the
copyright owner from complaining about photographs of the
completed work that are made and used in connection with news
reports, commentaries, and advertisements. Thus, an architect's
reproduction, distribution, and display rights in the copyright-
able aspects of a structure are not violated when photographs of
that structure are published.201 The copyright laws of several na-
tions that explicitly afford copyright protection to structures
contain similar provisions.20 2
A more troublesome limitation is presented in section
113(b), which provides:
(b) This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in
a work that portrays a useful article as such, any greater or
lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or dis-
play of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to
such works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law
or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held
applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under
this title.2 0 3
200. 17 U.S.C. § 113(c)(1982).
201. There is no doubt that a photograph of a copyrighted three-dimensional object
can infringe. See, e.g., Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). Thus, without the § 113(c) exemption, a building could not be photo-
graphed, since the photo "reproduces" the work, until the architect's copyright expired.
This restriction would be intolerable. Cf. Helimuth, supra note 1, at 184.
202. For instance, the German copyright statute immunizes pictures and other two-
dimensional representations of works permanently displayed on public streets, including
architectural exteriors. An Act Dealing with Copyright and Related Rights, Pt. I, § VI,
art. 59 (1965); see Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 184. This sort of provision is common in
statutes protecting architectural works. See generally STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 72-
74.
203. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1982). The Copyright Act of 1976 became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982)(transitional and supplementary provisions). Accord-
ingly, it is necessary to determine the scope of copyright protection afforded to architec-
tural works under the 1909 Act and common-law copyright. See N. BoorsTN, supra
note 13, § 5:10, at 143 ("This section provides that the rights of a copyright owner in a
work that portrays a useful article [architectural plans] shall be the same as under prior
law with respect to the reproduction (and distribution or display) of the useful article
[the architectural structure depicted in the plans] so portrayed."); 1 M. NIMMER, supra
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Thus, the rights granted to architects under the 1976 Act are no
different from the rights granted under common law and the
1909 Act. It was well established long before the passage of the
1976 Act that architectural plans were copyrightable and that, at
a minimum, the architect had protection against their reproduc-
tion in the form of another set of plans.204 Also, decisions in sev-
eral jurisdictions held that neither the required filing of plans
with a municipal official nor the erection of the structure de-
picted constituted a general publication divestive of the archi-
tect's common-law copyright.2 05 Further, despite case law au-
thority to the contrary and the unnecessary distinction between
copying for use and copying for explanation, this article has ar-
gued, and several pre-1978 cases have suggested, that plans are
infringed by their unauthorized use to build a structure.206
Most of the pre-1978 authorities, however, concluded that
functional structures, although attractively designed, are not
copyrightable as works in themselves. 2°7 These authorities ac-
knowledged that if a structure could be classified as a work of
art, then full protection might be appropriate for the structure
as a whole;208 yet most structures are not works of art. As a con-
note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-107 to -108; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 84. Professor Nimmer
points out that this subsection raises, but does not answer, some difficult choice of law
questions. He asserts that for any work, whether created before or after January 1, 1978,
the courts should act as if the 1976 Act had never been passed. If, as of the date of
alleged infringement, the plans had not been published or registered, then common-law
copyright rules should apply. Otherwise, the law under the 1909 Act should be followed.
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D] at 2-107 to -108. See generally Katz, supra note 2,
at 229.37; Cal. Comment, supra note 1, at 462-70 (both articles discussing protection of
architecture under common-law copyright and what constitutes a general publication
divestive of common-law rights).
204. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. 170, 179-80
(W.D. Tex. 1983); Krahmer v. Luing, 127 N.J. Super. 270, 317 A.2d 96 (Ch. Div. 1978);
Macmillan Co. v. I.V.O.W. Corp., 495 F. Supp. 1134, 1144-45 (D. Vt. 1980). See also
supra note 191.
206. See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text. But see Cornell Note, supra
note 3, at 84-85 (pre-1978 cases hold that copyright in plans does not grant the right to
build from plans).
207. See, e.g., STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 70-71, 76-77; N. BooRsTN, supra note
13, § 2:25, at 77; 1 M. NIMtER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-108; Cornell Note, supra
note 3, at 85-86.
208. Copyright secured protection against reproduction of that work of art, as in the
erection of a substantially similar monument. See, e.g., Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier,
16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936); STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 70; HR. Rap. No. 1476,
supra note 14, at 55; 1 M. NIMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-108. But see Wickham v.
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sequence, the scope of copyright protection was restricted by the
court-developed useful article limitations. 09 These limitations
are now codified in the definitions of "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works" and "useful article, ' 210 and the separability
and independence test arguably limits copyright protection to
the separable ornamental and decorative features that embellish
a structure.211 Accordingly, under both the prior law and the
1976 Act, an architect's rights are limited to the separable artis-
tic elements embodied in his structure's design; his rights do not
extend to that useful article's utilitarian features. Thus, the ma-
jor problem is identifying a structure's separable features.1 2
This article argues, however, that the Act's definitions and
its test of copyrightability should not be interpreted so restric-
tively as to limit the copyrightable aspects of a structure to fea-
tures like statuary, cornices, and other embellishments. Rather,
the Act should be so interpreted that an architect's original ex-
pression of the structure's interior and exterior is copyrightable.
The particular configuration of rooms, the arrangement of space
and shapes, the dimensions selected, the choices for materials
and the locations of rooms can all be conceptually separated
from the structure's functional aspects and should, therefore, be
protectible..2 1 The terms of section 113(b), granting the architect
rights no greater or lesser than those afforded under prior law,
do not prohibit this interpretation. This expansive definition of
the separable aspects of a structure's design merely enlarges the
Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 154, 156 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)(some
monumental structures are functional when economic and engineering considerations
dictate aspects of the design).
209. 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[D], at 2-108.
210. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
211. N. BooRSTYN, supra note 13, § 2:25, at 77-78; 1 K. NIMMER, supra note 6, §
2.08[D], at 2-108.
212. One commentator has written:
Under either the former or the current Act, a copyright owner's exclusive right
to reproduce a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work that portrays, depicts or
represents a useful article so that the utilitarian nature of the article can be
seen, is limited to the artistic element and does not extend to the useful article
itself.
N. BooRsTYN, supra note 13, § 5:10, at 143-44. This article argues that the separable and
copyrightable elements in a functional structure derived from protected plans encompass
much more of the architect's creative design product than just "add on" decorations and
ornamentation.
213. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
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range of copyrightable architectural subject matter.
2. The History of Copyright Revision
The history of the copyright revision process cuts against an
expansive definition of the copyrightable design aspects of func-
tional architectural structures. Several of the bills proposed be-
tween 1924 and 1940 to revise the 1909 Act contained provisions
for the protection of architectural works.214 These proposals gen-
erally went beyond protection for plans and models and men-
tioned "'works of architecture' (i.e., structures) and 'models or
designs for architectural works,' with the qualification that copy-
right extended only to the artistic character and design of such
works and not to the processes or methods of construction. '215
These bills apparently would have afforded protection not only
against the duplication of models and designs, but also against
their reproduction in actual structures.216 If these bills had been
enacted, architectural structures "would no doubt have been
protected against the reproduction of their artistic features in
similar structures. '217
Ultimately, however, none of these bills were enacted, and
the Register of Copyright's 1961 report on the general revision of
the law recommended that protection not be extended to the de-
signs of functional structures because
[i]n the case of architecture particularly, it would often be dif-
ficult to differentiate between the functional and the "artistic"
features of the design. While we are inclined to the view that a
limited measure of protection should be afforded to the designs
of functional structures, we do not believe that the copyright
statute provides the appropriate framework for their protec-
214. STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 71.
215. Id. (citing particular bills introduced in 1924, 1925, 1930, 1935, and 1940).
216. Id. Some of the bills cited accomplished this result by giving copyright owners
of all classes of works the exclusive right to reproduce or transform the work in any
medium, form, or manner. Others explicitly extended the exclusive rights to complete,
execute, and finish found in § 1(b) of the 1909 Act to models or designs for works of
architecture. Id.
217. Id. at 72. Some of the bills also provided that copyright would not be infringed
by the making and publishing of photographs of the structure, as in § 113(c) of the 1976
Act, and contained special provisions on deposit, registration, and limitations on reme-
dies. In addition, some of the proposals specified that construction would not constitute
publication. Id.
436 [Vol. 37
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tion. We would leave this protection to be dealt with in the
separate legislation proposed for the protection of ornamental
designs of useful articles.
2 1 8
It is important to note that since 1914 many industrial design
protection bills have been introduced,219 several of which might
have afforded protection to the designs of structures.220 None
were enacted, 221 however, primarily because of the fear that pro-
tection "would create a new monopoly which has not been justi-
fied by a showing that its benefits will outweigh the disadvan-
tage of removing such designs from free public use.
222
Thus, the primary objection to expanding the protection af-
forded to useful articles, including structures, has focused on the
difficulty in distinguishing between an article's functional and
artistic features.223 This concern reflects the delicate balance in
copyright law between the need to provide protection and incen-
tives for the creators of works of authorship and the fear that
ideas and concepts will be monopolized and competition re-
strained if copyright encompasses the utilitarian aspects of use-
ful articles. 24
This tension is reflected in the terms of the 1976 Act and in
its legislative history.225 Although copyright is available for
218. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 125, at 16; U.S.F. Com-
ment, supra note 122, at 324. The Register did recommend, however, that copyright
should continue to protect plans, nonfunctional structures, and drawings of nonfunc-
tional structures. Nonfunctional structures constitute works of art and could be pro-
tected on the same basis as sculptural works and drawings of sculptural works. REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 125, at 15-16; Hellmuth, supra note 1, at
176.
219. Dulin, Design Protection, 12 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 321, 325 (1965).
220. U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 324-25; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 86.
See also Drake Note, supra note 17, at 84-87 (discussing design patent protection for
architectural works).
221. Denicola, supra note 134, at 718-19; Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 86.
222. Denicola, supra note 134, at 719 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at
50).
223. U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 326; Heilmuth, supra note 1, at 176-77.
The drafters of the Revision also objected to the duration of protection, the appropriate
remedies, and the notice, deposit, and registration requirements. Several of the bills in-
troduced between 1924 and 1940 had, in fact, addressed these issues. U.S.F. Comment,
supra note 122, at 326-27; STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 71-72; see supra note 217.
224. U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 326. See supra notes 9 and accompanying
text, 141-45 and accompanying text.
225. Conflicts between the interests of creators and users (the public) are inherent
in copyright. See generally Baird, supra note 9, at 415. The Constitution authorizes ex-
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plans, as well as for pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works em-
bodied in useful articles, this protection is limited by the princi-
ple that ideas, systems, and methods are not copyrightable. In
addition, the separability and independence test limits the scope
of protection afforded to useful articles. 228 The House report,
recognizing that architectural works present a special situation,
stated that purely nonfunctional or monumental structures are
subject to full copyright protection and "the same would be true
of artistic sculpture or . . . embellishment added to a struc-
ture.' ' 227 The report added, however, that "where the only ele-
ments of shape in an architectural design are conceptually insep-
arable from the utilitarian aspects of the structure, copyright
protection for the design would not be available. '2 s
This commentary on the new Act does not prohibit copy-
right protection for useful structures. Rather, it shows that the
scope of copyright protection afforded to a useful structure de-
pends upon the interpretation of the separability test.229 Thus,
the terms of the 1976 Act and its legislative history can accom-
modate an expansive definition of the separable copyrightable
features embodied in useful structures.
The Act can be interpreted to protect the conceptually sep-
arable aspects of a building, such as the architect's particular
configuration of rooms, shapes, space, and dimensions. Useful
articles must be scrutinized in order to determine which features
clusive rights only for limited periods. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Act itself grants
exclusive rights, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982), and then subjects them to several specific limita-
tions, Id. §§ 110-18. This tension is also reflected in the fair use doctrine, as codified at
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Thus, two competing policies are balanced through copyright
protection. One court explained: "[I]f the protectible scope of an author's writings is too
narrowly defined he will be discouraged from further writing. If, however, the protectible
scope of the original author's work is too broadly defined, creative work by others will be
discouraged." Morrison v. Solomons, 494 F. Supp. 218, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
226. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of "picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works")(1982), 102(b). The House Report acknowledged that
plans are copyrightable, that purely nonfunctional or monumental structures should be
subject to full copyright protection, and that ornamentation or embellishments added to
a structure should also be protectible. See generally Cornell Note, supra note 3 (arguing
for changes in the Copyright Act to afford greater protection to architectural works). See
also supra notes 178-84.
227. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55.
228. Id.
229. Id.
[Vol. 37
HeinOnline  -- 37 S. C. L. Rev.  438 1985-1986
ARCHITECTURAL COPYRIGHT
are copyrightable and which aspects are utilitarian. Admittedly,
it is difficult to differentiate between the functional aspects and
the physically or conceptually separable design features of any
useful article. 230 Courts, however, have been making these diffi-
cult distinctions for works of applied art for many years; the
task of making the same distinctions for architectural works
should be no more difficult.
23 1
The designs of functional structures are worthy of copyright
protection and the creative efforts of architects are trivialized
when protection is limited to plans and the physically separable
decorations and embellishments of the building. While ideas,
methods of construction, and design concepts cannot be monop-
olized, an architect's particular arrangement of shapes, spaces,
dimensions, materials, and components are conceptually separa-
ble from a structure's utilitarian aspects. These design features
are not inextricably interwoven with a structure's utilitarian
function since there are many ways for an architect to express
his ideas on the arrangement and configuration of a particular
kind of structure. Those aspects of a design, as well as embel-
lishment and ornamentation, should be regarded as the archi-
tect's copyrightable works of authorship. These creative aspects
are separate and apart from the general and unprotectible con-
ception of a functioning home or office building and should be
deemed to stand alone conceptually as copyrightable works.
230. Cf. U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 326; see also supra notes 155-95 and
accompanying text, 223-24 and accompanying text.
231. Courts attempt to distinguish between the functional and nonfunctional fea-
tures of products in trademark and trade dress litigation as well as in copyright litiga-
tion. See generally Olds & Hoy, Developments in the Doctrine of Functionality, in CUR-
RENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADEMARK LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 129-134 (1984). A
design feature may not serve as a trademark if it is "functional." Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). A design feature is "functional" if it is
"essential to the purpose of the article or ... affects the cost or quality of the article."
Id. at 850 n. 10. In some cases plaintiffs have alleged that the configuration or trade
dress of the structures they use in their businesses functions as a symbol of their services
and is entitled to protection against copying by competitors. See, e.g., Fotomat Corp. v.
Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977) (Fotomat's small, free standing
kiosk topped by overhanging three-tiered roof was functional and not protectible). Con-
tra Fotomat Corp. v. Ace Corp., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 92 (S.D. Cal. 1980) (shape of booth
was only incidentally functional; its primary purpose was to identify the corporation);
Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Kan. 1977)(shape of booth was not
dictated by its function, but was significant for identifying the owner). These cases show
that in the trade dress area, as in copyright, it is difficult to determine whether a particu-
lar feature of a useful article is functional.
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Those decisions that have denied protection to the designs of
relatively simple articles like wheel covers, mannequins, and
light fixtures are inapposite.232
3. The Originality Standard
At the turn of the century Justice Holmes wrote:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvi-
ous limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation .... At the other end, copyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less
educated than the judge.233
This warning against judicial assessment of artistic merit was re-
peated by the Supreme Court fifty years later in Mazer v.
Stein:2 34 "Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a
power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art. 2 35 The 1976
Act now reflects this same concern. Congress, intending to incor-
porate without change the lenient standard of originality estab-
lished by the courts under the 1909 Act, deliberately left unde-
fined the phrase "original works of authorship" contained in
section 102. That standard does not include requirements of
novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit.236 Similarly, the Act's defi-
nition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" does not im-
ply any criteria of "artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic
quality. ' 237 The category includes not only works of art in the
traditional sense, but also graphic art, illustrations, works in-
tended for use in advertising and commerce, and works of ap-
plied art. Thus, this category encompasses all original pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works embodied in useful articles, re-
232. See, e.g., Norris Indus. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,
594 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), afi'd, 773 F.2d 1238 (2d Cir. 1985).
233. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
234. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
235. Id. at 214. See also Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1970),
rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
236. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 51.
237. Id. at 54 (discussing the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"
in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
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gardless of mass production and commercial exploitation.23 s
The 1976 Act's separability and independence test, however,
effectively precludes copyright protection for the designs of
some useful articles. For instance, in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer,23
the court of appeals reversed the district court and held that a
lighting fixture "in nontraditional form, devoid of ornamenta-
tion or decoration but of pleasing shape and used apparently for
outside lighting of parking lots"" was not protectible because
no feature was separable or distinguishable from the article's
form.2 41 Similarly, in Norris Industries v. International Tele-
phone & Telegraph Corp.,242 the court denied protection for
wire-spoked wheel covers, despite their creator's arguments that
they were ornamental and intended to adorn the wheel and hide
its ugliness. The court held that they were "not superfluous or-
namental designs, but functional components of utilitarian arti-
cles. ' '243 The separability and independence test precluded pro-
tection because no feature was physically or conceptually
separable from the covers' utilitarian aspects.2 44 Although these
results arguably effectuate congressional intent to exclude indus-
trial design from the subject matter of copyright,245 they are not
consistent with Justice Holmes' warning against weighing artis-
tic merit to avoid discrimination against particular styles. In es-
238. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 54.
239. 414 F. Supp. 939, (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
240. 414 F. Supp. at 940.
241. 591 F.2d at 805-06. The court of appeals' decision was based primarily on the
scope of review for administrative determinations. The Register of Copyrights had held
that the fixture was not copyrightable. See also Hauhart, supra note 12, at 113-15.
242. 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983). See generally Note,
Copyrighting Three-Dimensional Objects: Norris Industries v. International Telephone
and Telegraph Corporation, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 821, 830 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Bay-
lor Note].
243. 696 F.2d at 924.
244. Baylor Note, supra note 242, at 832.
245. The House report stated:
On the other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be aes-
thetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee's intention is not to offer it
copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an automobile, air-
plane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial prod-
uct contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as
separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be
copyrighted under the bill.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 14, at 55.
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sence, the Act's approach to determining the copyrightability of
works of applied art favors traditional art forms and denies pro-
tection to some less conventional styles, such as modern abstract
utilitarian design.246
If useful structures are treated like works of industrial de-
sign, a similar inconsistency will result. Structures falling within
some architectural styles, such as a Miesian style office building,
would not be entitled to any copyright protection, while separa-
ble embellishments adorning a Victorian style home would be
copyrightable.241 To interpret the separability and independence
test in a manner that favors certain styles, but denies any pro-
tection whatsoever to others, offends the admonitions of Justice
Holmes and Mazer v. Stein,248 as well as the principle that the
originality standard does not incorporate any standard of artistic
merit.249 Because of the wide variety of ways architects can ex-
press themselves in designing functional structures, it is inap-
propriate to apply the separability test woodenly to architectural
works. The copyright law should not be interpreted in a manner
that discriminates against particular styles. Rather, an expansive
approach to defining the copyrightable aspects of useful struc-
tures can be applied uniformly to all styles and schools of design
to avoid violating the principle that copyright protection is not
dependent upon any standard of aesthetic merit or taste. In es-
sence, therefore, one architect's unconventional expression of the
246. Note, Works of Applied Art: An Expansion of Copyright Protection, 56 S. CAL.
L. Rav. 241, 253 (1982); Note, Copyright Law-Copyright Protection for Industrial De-
signs Under the 1976 Copyright Act, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 923, 929 (1979). For instance, a
two-slice toaster, made of aluminum and designed as a simple rectangular box, without
ornamentation, would not be protectible. In contrast, a toaster with the outward appear-
ance of a loaf of bread, made of a heat resistant plastic, might be protectible because its
sculptured body-the plastic loaf of bread-could stand alone, physically or concep-
tually, as a "work of art" apart from the toaster's utilitarian aspects. See e.g., Ted Ar-
nold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)(casing of pencil sharpener
designed to look like an antique telephone protectible). Note, Copyright
Law-Copyright Protection for Industrial Designs Under the 1976 Copyright Act, 25
WAYNE L. REv. 929, 933 (1979). Some people might not regard this "pop art" toaster
designed to look like a loaf of bread as conventional, let alone as art. Nevertheless, the
Act warns against passing judgment on artistic merit, and since this toaster casing can be
separated from the article's utilitarian function, it should be copyrightable.
247. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
248. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
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modest home presented in the hypothetical design contest25
should be afforded no less protection than another architect's
more conventional design for that home.
B. Protection of Architectural Works in Other Countries
An expansive approach to defining the copyrightable design
aspects of structures will grant protection roughly equivalent to
that afforded architectural works in several other nations.2 " The
United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1956, for example, provides
copyright in "works of architecture, being either buildings or
models for buildings" as a species of "artistic works."2 52 Such
works, subject to several limitations, are protected against repro-
duction "in any material form. '25 3 The French copyright statute
protects "works of . . .architecture" and "plans, sketches, and
plastic works relative to . . . architecture. '25 4 All authors in
France are accorded the exclusive right of reproduction,255 which
is defined as "the material fixation of the work by all methods
that permit of indirect communication to the public. '25 6 In the
case of architectural works, "reproduction shall also consist in
the repeated execution of a plan or standard draft. '25 7 The Ger-
man copyright statute specifically protects architectural works
as a subcategory of "artistic works. 25 Authors in Germany have
the exclusive right to reproduce, as well as to distribute and ex-
hibit.2 59 Several foreign statutes also afford architects moral
250. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
251. See generally STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 73-74; Heilmuth, supra note 1, at
180-87; U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 326-27.
252. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74, pt. I, § 3(1)(b) (1956)[hereinafter cited as English Act];
STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 73.
253. English Act, supra note 252, pt. I, § 3(5)(a); STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 95.
254. Law No. 57-296 on Literary and Artistic Property, art. 3 (1957)[hereinafter
cited as French Act], quoted in STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 73. See also Hellmuth,
supra note 1, at 185.
255. French Act, supra note 254, arts. 21, 40, 47. See STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at
73.
256. French Act, supra note 254, art. 28, quoted in STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at
73.
257. French Act, supra note 254, art. 28, quoted in STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at
73. See also Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 185-87.
258. An Act Dealing with Copyright and Related Rights, pt. I, § II, art.
2(4)(1965)[hereinafter cited as German Act]. See Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 182.
259. Helmuth, supra note 1, at 183.
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rights and droit de suite in addition to the fundamental eco-
nomic rights of controlling reproduction and adaptations.6 0
In exchange for such expansive copyright protection, how-
ever, structures are subjected to some special limitations. For in-
stance, some nations provide, either through their statutes or
through judicial rulings, that an architect's rights do not extend
to processes or methods of construction,2 1 that copyright is not
infringed by making and publishing a photograph of a struc-
ture,26 2 and that the remedies for infringement do not include
restraining the completion of a structure or ordering the de-
struction of an infringing building.2 3 At a minimum, therefore,
the fact that other countries extend copyright protection to
structures emphasizes the need for a more tolerant approach to
copyrightability in the United States; these foreign laws bolster
the argument that very few risks would result from defining ex-
pansively the separable, copyrightable aspects of completed
structures.26'
C. The Ramifications of Expanded Protection
Judicial recognition of the architect's right to control the
use of his plans,265 combined with an expansive definition of the
copyrightable aspects of functional structures, will provide
greater economic incentives and will grant architects protection
260. Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 182-87 (discussing the German and French
statutes).
261. STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 73 & n.51 (discussing this limitation with re-
spect to architectural works in France and Germany).
262. English Act supra note 252, pt. I, § 9(4), (6); German Act, supra note 258, pt. I,
§ VI, art. 59; STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 73-74; Hellmuth, supra note 1, at 184. This
sort of limitation is necessary because a photograph of a copyrighted three-dimensional
object can infringe. See, e.g., Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp.
981 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
263. English Act, supra note 252, pt. I, § 17(4); German Act, supra note 258, pt. IV,
§ II, art. 97-105; STUDY No. 27, supra note 2, at 73-74; Helmuth, supra note 1, at 184.
264. Several of these foreign statutes, as well as several of the bills introduced in
Congress between 1924 and 1940, deal with copyright formalities such as deposit, regis-
tration, and notice requirements, as well as with appropriate limitations on remedies and
the scope of protection. These foreign laws and proposed bills address adequately many
of the objections raised in the REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 125.
See U.S.F. Comment, supra note 122, at 327. The primary objection is the problem of
distinguishing between a structure's functional and nonfunctional features. See supra
notes 214-32 and accompanying text.
265. Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 95, 97 (the right to build).
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comparable to that afforded the creators of other artistic and
sculptural works. Original and creative designs will be en-
couraged without restraining competition and without preclud-
ing the legitimate borrowing of architectural ideas and con-
cepts. 266 An expansive definition of the architect's rights against
the unauthorized reproduction and use of his artistic cre-
ations-his plans and the resulting structure-does not contra-
vene the fundamental principle, set forth in the Act, that ideas,
concepts, systems, and processes are not protectible.6 7 The ar-
chitect's copyright would not extend to a general concept, such
as the modest three bedroom home in the hypothetical design
contest.26 8 Any architect can attempt to design a similar struc-
ture independently, regardless of the other architect's copy-
righted plans and finished building.2 9 More particularly, an ar-
chitect's copyright does not encompass processes and methods of
construction or any exclusive rights to the use of elements like
skylights, atriums, courtyards, domes, columns, and basic
shapes. Rather, it is the designer's particular arrangement, treat-
ment, and configuration of such unprotectible elements that
should be regarded as the copyrightable expression embodied in
both his plans and the structure.270
In addition, copyright protection for plans and structures
does not preclude architects from drawing upon common
sources, borrowing ideas and concepts, or imitating the general
styles of their contemporaries and predecessors.27' Similarities
between plans and structures are inevitable when architects in-
dependently test their skills on similar projects, and copyright
cannot and must not prevent that from taking place. 2  On the
266. Cf. id. at 91-94.
267. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
268. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
269. Similarly, any author can write a comedy based upon conflicts between Irish
and Jews into which the marriage of their children becomes the central focus. That
"plot" is no more susceptible of copyright than the general outline of Romeo and Juliet.
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
270. Cf. Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir.
1977).
271. Cf. Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 91-94.
272. An analogy to music is appropriate; since composers of popular music have a
limited number of tones at their disposal, similarity of tone construction is inevitable.
Further, it is generally agreed that the original fund of melodic ideas has been exhausted
so that composers must turn to the use of rhythm and harmony to attain originality. A.
SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 197 (2d ed. 1939). Similarly, architects work in a confined
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other hand, similarities resulting from the "copying" of plans or
an existing structure may give rise to an infringement claim. The
well-settled requirements for establishing copyright infringe-
ment guarantee that an architect's copyright cannot be used to
retard progress in this important art.
For example, in the hypothetical architectural design con-
test described above,273 an architect's copyright would not be in-
fringed by another designer's independent creation of a similar
home27 4 because "[a]bsent copying there can be no infringement
of copyright. 2 75 The copyright owner must, therefore, demon-
strate the fact of copying270 and prove substantial similarity of
copyrightable expression.277 If the architect can show that his
plans were actually reproduced or used by the alleged infringer,
his case should be relatively strong. Copying of plans to make
another set of plans violates the reproduction right. Similarly, if
the architect's plans are used, the resulting structure will proba-
bly be substantially similar to the architect's creation and a
finding of infringement would be appropriate.
An infringement claim will be more difficult to prove when
the plaintiff cannot show copying or use of his plans. In that
situation the architect must prove copying of the protectible as-
pects of the structure. The architect may be able to establish a
strong inference of copying by showing that the defendant had
access to the structure-that he had seen it and perhaps walked
through it-and that there are many similarities between the ar-
chitect's copyrighted structure and the alleged infringing
work.278 On the other hand, similarities resulting from the fact
that both structures are based on the same general concept-a
modest three bedroom home-will not provide the basis for a
successful claim.279 Further, although striking similarities be-
area and must turn to the arrangement of spaces and shapes and to types of rooms for
their original treatments of an idea like a modest, single family home. See Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2228-29 (1985)(discussing the
importance of the idea/expression dichotomy).
273. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
274. Cf. Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936).
275. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
276. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
277. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
278. Cf. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
279. Cf. Marshall v. Yates, 27 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 658, 137,
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tween the structures may create a presumption of copying,280 the
copyright owner still must show a substantial and material tak-
ing28 l of protectible expression.282 The architect will not have to
establish that the defendant's copying was intentional,283 but his
burden will be heavy because of the basic requirements of proof
and because of the nature of the copyrighted work.
In some respects functional architectural works are analo-
gous to factual literary works, such as biographies, histories, cat-
alogues, and directories. Major portions of these writings consist
of elements that cannot be protected by copyright: facts, se-
quences of events, and raw data.8 4 These elements are compara-
ble to design concepts, ideas, structural processes, borrowings
from common sources, and generalized styles in architectural
works. Broad latitude is given to subsequent authors of factual
literary works,285 and substantial latitude should be given to
later architects as well so that they can modify and perhaps im-
prove upon unprotectible architectural styles, ideas, and
concepts.28 6
Further, in order to establish infringement of a factual
work, the required similarity of expression may have to amount
to verbatim reproduction or very close paraphrasing.28 7 By anal-
ogy, an architect charging infringement of the copyrightable as-
pects of his functional structure should have to show more than
just the defendant's roughly similar treatment of the basic pro-
ject. A plaintiff should have to prove substantial similarity in
the proportion and arrangement of rooms, the locations of doors
and windows, and the use of space. If the interior or exterior
configurations of the defendant's structure are very similar to
137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1983)(similarities that exist because two works treating the same his-
torical material cannot provide the basis for an infringement claim).
280. A. LATMAN, supra note 12, at 161-62.
281. Id. at 161.
282. Cf. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975).
283. A. LATMAN, supra note 12, at 160-62.
284. See generally Shipley & Hay, Protecting Research: Copyright, Common-Law
Alternatives, and Federal Preemption, 63 N.C.L. REv. 125, 129-34 (1984).
285. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 105 S.
Ct. 513 (1985).
286. See Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 91-94 (discussing the importance of imita-
tion and borrowing in architecture).
287. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984).
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the plaintiff's design, then the plaintiff would seem to have es-
tablished that the defendant copied more than the law allows.288
An architect should not be able to recover without such a show-
ing.289 Thus, the existing requirements for proving copyright in-
fringement will prevent architects from monopolizing unpro-
tectible concepts and ideas as well as the functional aspects of
their structures.
VI. CONCLUSION
Architectural works of authorship include structures as well
as plans, and the Copyright Act of 1976 affords protection to
both these forms of architectural expression. Some courts have,
however, expansively interpreted the 1879 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Baker v. Selden to prevent architects from controlling
the use of their plans. In addition, the Act's limitations on the
copyrightability of useful articles arguably restrict the pro-
tectible aspects of functional structures to separable ornamenta-
tion and embellishment. Taken together, these limitations se-
verely diminish the value of copyright protection for
architectural works. As a consequence, copyright protection of-
fers few incentives to architects.
In order to promote progress in this importanft art form and
to grant architects copyright protection commensurate to that
already enjoyed by other artists, the courts should reconsider
their approaches to these limitations.290 The Baker decision not-
withstanding, courts should recognize the right to control the
use of plans as part of the reproduction right. Furthermore, they
288. This conclusion may not be appropriate for the designs of some very simple
structures like garages and storage buildings with a single room and dimensions dictated
by the sizes of vehicles. Arguably, there are very few ways to express that "idea," and an
architect may not be entitled to relief absent a showing of slavish copying.
289. Appropriate relief would ordinarily be a monetary award based on the plain-
tiff's damages, the defendant's profits, or a combination of the two. Injunctive relief,
either restraining the completion of the defendant's structure or mandating its destruc-
tion, should not be granted. See supra note 95.
290. This article has not discussed the nature and scope of protection architects
might enjoy under the design patent provisions of the Patent Act, unfair competition, or
the moral rights doctrine. See generally Loyola Note, supra note 3, at 99-101, 117-126;
Cornell Note, supra note 3, at 87-91; Drake Note, supra note 17; Robert H. Jacobs, Inc.
v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 205 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1984)(plaintiff ar-
chitect unsuccessfully claimed that his architectural work was protectible under Califor-
nia's codification of the moral rights doctrine).
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should expansively define the separable copyrightable aspects
embodied in useful structures. This expansion of architects'
rights against the copying and unauthorized use of their intellec-
tual creations can be accomplished under the Copyright Act of
1976 without amendment, without contravening the principle
that copyright protection does not extend to ideas and concepts,
and without affording protection to the utilitarian aspects of
useful structures.
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